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Fig. 1. Florida's chi ef expo rt cities in 1860. Ma p by author.

Introduction
From the moment of its admission to the Union in 1845, Florida's economy was

structured around its nume rous ports and th e ability to ship resou rces to centers of
production and commerce. The population of Florida reflected thi s reality. Most

Floridians were part-timers, snowbirds who came so uth not for the enjoyable
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weather so much as the economic opportunities created by climate and peninsular
geography. During the peak season of December to April in the 1840s and 18505,
the Gulf Coast's population swelled with the arrival of Northerners and foreigners
seeking profit in Apalachicola, primarily in the cash crop industry of cotton. Down
the coast in Tampa, the cattle industry was growing as local ranchers found markets
in the Caribbean Sea. The ability to connect cotton and cattle with buyers was
facilitated by Florida's approximately 1,800 mites of coastlin e and an expanding

shipping industry.
Throughout its in itial fifteen years of statehood, shipping defined the state's
economy. During the winter months, non·southerners by birth far outnumbered the
permanent or lifelong residents of the Florida Gulf-Coast. 1 Though it was the
southernmost state in the Union, it would have been a stretch to consider Florida
truly a part of the South, either in demographics or culture. In the decades
preceding the American Civil War, the state's centers of popu lation were exclusively
port cities inhabited by a regionally, nationally, and racially diverse lot. 2 A lack of
cohesive state identity made Florida less of an actor and more of an object in the
conflict that was to come.
On the tenth of January, 1861, Florida became the third state to secede from
the Union. The decision was no doubt strongly motivated by Florida's slaveholding
interests - a move to reject the narrow election of the nation's first Republican
1 Lynn Willoughby, Fair to MiddJin': The Antebellum Cotton Trade o[the
Apalachicola/Chatahoochee River Valley (Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama
Press, 1993), 12.
2 Wilma Louise Handley, "The Labourers are all slaves: Slavery and Hiring-Out in an
Antebellum Gulf Coast Community" (M.A. Thesis, University of West Florida, 1999),
54.

)
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President, a party founded on an anti-slavery platform. On the eve of secession,
Florida's slave owners were wealthy in chattel property. The state was by far the
least populous in the South, totaling only 140,424 souls, yet 44 percent of these
Floridians were in bondage. 3 Protecting slavery gave those in a position of power
and influence in Florida a cultural and economic motivation for secession.
Ironically, the actions taken to protect the institution only hastened its demise.
tearing apart in four years of bloody conflict what had been entrenched in southern
culture over the preceding three centuries. The exploitation of slave labor had
created enormous wealth. The 1860 census calculated the cash value of farms in the
state to be $16,435,727 4 . Southern plantation owners and politicians had little
incentive to tinker with the structure of their work force.
While the Deep South sought to protect its slave culture, Florida elected to
join the Confederacy because of the economic considerations unique to the
geography of a peninsu lar state. Economic considerations were important both in
Florida's decision to secede and in the Union and Confederacy's desire to possess
Florida, The state's importance to the United States and the emerging Confederacy
as secession became ap parent was determined, in large part, by its port cities. For
the South, Florida's abundance of coastline made protection of slavery a subordinate
consideration to tariff reform. With Florida's loyalties up for grabs, the Union and

U.S. Census Bureau, Census Material from 1840 to 1890, Historical Census
Browser, University of Virginia,
http://fisher.lib.vi rginia.edu/collections/ ril stats/histcensus/i ndex.h tm!.
4 U.s. Census Office. Agriculture of the United States in 1860: Compiled from the
Original Returns of the Eight Census (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office,
1864).
3
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Confederacy both placed high value on Florida's allegiance because of the cotton and
cattle trades. These concerns, therefore, drove the underlying motivations of the
principal actors in Florida's secession.
Florida's ports provided a potential gateway for foreign goods into the North
American continent. The importation of those goods, however, came at a cost.
Southern critics of th e 1861 Morrill Tariff Act pointed to the disparate effect high
protective tariffs had on the economic growth of the southern agricultural states as
opposed to the northern industrial states. The abi lity to be free from high protective
tariffs was an inducement to Florida business leaders to support the secession
movement Because shipping was the dominant industry in a largely unsettled,
underdeveloped state, the stakes were high in determining Florida's allegiance. The
Federal government's main interest in Florida ports as they related to import tariffs
was not the protection of a continued stream of income, but rather the protection of
points of entry to domestic markets. The ability to circumvent approved ports
would sh ift traffic to seceded ports and greatly diminish the amount of federal
revenue col lected.
The cotton trade served as the stimu lu s for exponential economic growth of
the United States throughout the nineteenth century. Together with the
development of internal transportation, cotton was the catalyst for an increased
standard of living and internal tax revenue. The delivery of American cotton to
foreign ports was necessary in order to purchase foreign goods and to fund the

•

expanding federal government. The unpredictability offuture cotton output and
market s hare made Florida's ports a valued asset to the Federal government and the
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Rebel forces. While Florida's ports cou ld not match the output of its larger
competitors, the ability to divert cotton traffic to Apalachicola, Pensacola,
Fernandina, and the like was an interest worth protecting.
The United States government and the emerging Confederate States of
America recognized the enormous potential of Florida for providing the beef
necessary to field vast armies. While Florida's total cattle holdings were small in

comparison to seve ral other states of the south, its per capita cattle holdings ranked
nea r the top. meaning local demand was sma ll enough to export huge quantities of
cattle witho ut negatively impacting the state's civilian population. Florida's
geographical location to the east of the Mississippi River made its cattle holdings
more important to the Confederate war effort as Union victories cut off western
supplies. Lastly, Florida's ports created the opportunity to move cattle out of state
more efficiently to deliver to troops elsewhere. Th is possibility was recognized and
utilized by both sides, with the Union expending considerable effort to keep Florida
cattle out of the north Florida, Alabama, an d Louisiana ports.

-

•
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Chapter 1

High Tariffs in a State of Ports
Alexander Hamilton articulated what became the essence of early American
economic policy in his 1791 Report on Manufactures. The report stated a preference
for moderate import duties, allowing encouragement of domestic industry but not

necessarily protection. Hamilton had long recognized the dangers of an unbalanced
tariff, warning "exorbitant duties on imp orted articJ es ... tend to render other classes
of the community tributary in an improper degree to the manufacturing classes to

whom they give a premature monopoly of the market "1 In an effort to pay down the
new nation's revolutionary wa r debt, Hamilton sought to maximize government
revenue and promote efficie ncy in domestic industry through what he deemed to be
reasonable tariffrates. 2 Thomas Jefferson argued that these policies wo uld generate
geographic favoritism and disadvantage the agrarian South. This sectional dispute
appea red aga in on a recurring basis throughout the antebellum nineteenth century,
to be settled alo ng with the even more co ntentious issue of slavery with four years
of bloodshed.
Trade and tariffs played a significant role in the North/South fracture of the
Civil War, and, for Florida, the desire to be free offederal import duties was
important in the state's secession decision. Florida's manufacturing industry was
non-existent in 1860. Its economy was emerging in agriculture, cattle ranching. and
most importantly, sh ippin g. The federal government valued the continued in cl usio n
Roy P. Fairfield, ed., The Federalist Papers (Ba ltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1981), 93.
2 Douglas A. Irwin, "The Aftermath of the Report on Manufactures," The Journa l of
Economic History 64:3 (September 2004): 800.
1
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of Florida in the Union in part due to the tariff revenue implications of a successful

secession. The loss of Florida to a free and independent Confederate States of
America would have resulted in a decline in tax revenue collected not only in the

South. bu t in the North as well. The protection of U.S, import revenue was
contin gent upon the preservation of the entire coastline of the United States,
including the long peninsular coast of Florida.

The issue of tariffs had been a source of strain on relations between the
North a nd South from the inception of the United States. Well before ind ependence,

climate and soil conditio ns prevented the population centers of the northeast from
serving as the breadbasket of the continent. While plantations grew in the fertile
south, New England industry developed around commerce and the high seas,
producing generations of fishermen, longsho rem en, and a strong merchant class.
As passed by Congress in the nascent days of the republic, import duties served to
protect the shipping industries of the North, but did little to incubate manufacturi ng
firms developing in the new nation. The War of 1812 provided a system shock to
the economy of the northeastern states. Manufacturing firms had arisen during the
conflict as trade with Europe had been arrested by the British blockade. 3 With the
peace came commerce, and therefore competition from large, skilled French and

-

F.W. Taussig, The Tariff History a[the United States, Part 1,5'" ed. (New York: G.P.
Putnam & Sons, 1910), Online edition prepared by William Harshbarger. The Ludwig
von Mjses Institute, © 2003, hltp: //mi ses, orelelexlsltauss ig.pdf, 10.

3
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British manufacturers, flooding the market with less expensive imported goods and
forcing inexperienced but promising American manufacturers out of business. 4

Because of the struggling incipient American industry's inability to compete
with foreign firms, Congress passed a series of protective tariffs designed to
incubate domestic manufacturing by protecting it from outside competition. By
definition, these protective tariffs were not for purposes of revenue alone. As the
scope and magnitude of the government was exponentially smaller than the modern
enormous machine, much less revenue was needed to support the government;
therefore taxation was confined to primarily import duties and alcohol. These
import duties were the bane of traders' and merchants' existence. Driving up costs
for importers that were then passed on to wholesalers and merchants, the trade
tariffs resulted in higher than market costs for imported goods to consumers in the
United States.
Import tariffs were the largest single source of revenue every year of the
nation's existence from 1789-1860, with the sole exception of 1836. 5 The sale of
public lands briefly overtook customs duties as the chief source of government
revenue in the mid-1830s, but aside from that anomaly, approximately 90 percent of
federal revenue emanated from tariffs between 1820 and 1860. 6 The coastal states,
by definition, experienced a more direct impact from these tariffs. The ports of New

Paul Calore, The Causes a/the Civil War: The Political, Cultural, Economic, and
Territorial Disputes Between North and South Uefferson, NC: McFarland & Co.
Publishers, 2008), 32.
5 Robert A McGuire & T. Norman Van Cott, "The Confederate Constitution, Tariffs,
and the Laffer Relationship," Economic Inquiry 40:3 Duly 2002): 429.
6 Mark Thornton, and Robert Ekelund, Jr. Tariffs, Blockades, and Inflation: The
Economics o/the Civil War (Wilmington, DE: SR Books, 2004), 13.
4

-
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York, Boston, Charleston, New Orleans, Mobile, a nd Apalachicola contributed
significantly more to federal coffers than the average U.S. city because of the volume

of commerce received at their ports. Indirectly, interior states contributed to these
taxes as well, paying higher prices on goods to eve ntu ally caver the tax liability of

importers.
An effective lobby by American industry produced legislation to increase
tariffs on imported goods. These duties drove up the final retail prices of foreign
goods, thereby lowering the demand. This effect of revenue tariffs created a market

distorting motivation to tax for other purposes. )fimported goods are made more
expensive, the demand for local and domestic products will increase and those
ind ustries will be, in essence, "protected." A protective tariff, then, is one imposed
beyond what is necessary to generate maximum revenue and serves a secondary
purpose of giving national industry a leg-up over foreign competition. Domestic
manufacturers can then raise prices without an increase in costs, allowing for more
employment and greater profits at the expense of the consumer.' Henry Clay
be lieved a se nsible protective tariff would unify the interests of the nation, creating
a market in northeastern textile firms for southe rn cotton.a But the manufacture of
finished goods was primarily a northern endeavor, and the indu stria l region of New
England experienced the benefit of protective legislation.
The added cost through the tariff of imported goods increased the demand in
the North for domestically produced manufactures, which fostered the growth of

' Ibid., 14.
8 Marc Egnal, Clash of Extremes: The Economic Origins of the Civil War (New York:
Hill and Wang. 2009), 33.
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northern industries. The cotton South, a cash-poor society, was connected to

European manufacturing through its cotton factors, who sold the crop in exchange
for goods unavailable in the local economy.9 The South, as a consumer of
manufactured goods, was forced to pay higher prices (typically in the currency of
cotton) for goods received from the proceeds of cotton shipments. Simply put, it
took more cotton to buy European goods as a result of the tariff, reducing the
amount of wealth flowing into southern ports. Having little industrial production of
their own, southern ports exported primarily agricultural products and were
dependent on northern and European production of manufactured goods, to In
addition, southern coastal cities' leaders feared protective tariffs imposed by the
United States would result in retaliatory tariffs on cotton being shipped from the
South, lowering the demand for their chief export. 11 Therefore, protective tariffs
benefitted the North while reducing the potential wealth of the South, as these
economically disparate regions unequally shared the tax burden.
Congressional attempts to protect burgeoning American industry through
the application of protective ta riffs widened the economic gap separating the North

and the South. The Tariff of 1828, known in the South as the Tariff of Abominations,
raised import duties significantly for protective pu rposes. To southern states, these
rates were an outrage, one not adequately ameliorated by a reduction in the Tariff of

John Boles, The South Through Time: A History of on American Region (Englewood
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1995), 190.
10 Thornton and Ekelund, Jr., Tariffs, Blockades, and Inflation, 16.
11 John L. Conger "South Carolina and the Early Tariffs," The Mississippi Volley
Historical Review 5:4 (March 1919): 424.

9
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1832.12 South Carolina responded to the tariff by declaring it null and void,

threatening the perpetuity of the Union if states could decide which federal laws

they chose to obey. The Compromise Tariff of 1833 weakly stitched toge th er a
fragile nation spli t along secti onal lines,13 Congress reduced the high protective
tariffs of 1832 by the compromise over the cou rse of the next ten years. By 1842,
northern industry was again clamoring with su pport for an increase in protective
tariffs. 14 Luckily fo r the North, this coincided with the ascension of the Wh ig Party
to the presidency in the form of Wi llia m Henry Harri son (very briefly) and John

Tyler to suppo rt the so· called Black Ta riff, raisi ng import duties to their 1832 levels.
Southern states lacked the congressional representation to effectively
legislate for their ports. The sectional votes simply did not exist in the Sou th to
strike back un til th e makeup of the House of Representatives was al tered.
Representative Joshua R. Giddings of Ohio warned of the pending entry of Texas to
the Union, pleading with his fellow congressmen, "Are the liberty loving democrats
of Pennsylvania ready to give up the tariff to strike off all protection .. .in order to
purchase a slave market for the ir neighbors?"ls Giddings's warnings that th e
surrender of th e balance of political power to the South would surren der the tariff
went unheeded 16, as the ad mission of Texas in 1846 was instrumental in passing the

Taussig, The Tariff History o[the United States, Partl, 14.
13 Taussig, The Tariff History o[ th e United States, Partl, 32; Thornton and Ekelund,
Jr., Tariffs, Blockades, and Inflation, 22.
14 Taussig, The Tariff History o[the United States, Part 1,69.
IS Norman A. Graebner, Politics and the Crisis of 1860 (Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 1961), 10.
\6 Calore, The Causes o[the Civil War, 12 5.
12
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legislation that would reverse the tariffs. The addition of a slave state strengthened
congressional representation in opposition to protective tariff increases.
Southern tariff reformers welcomed the election of James K. Polk, who signed

into law the Walker Tariff, effectively reversing the high rates of the ea rlier Black
Tariff. l 1 The see·saw of ta riff rates was far from over. The Panic of 1857, following
massive tariff reductions of that same year, gave protectionists fuel for their
arguments that high import duties were necessary to preserve American jobs and,

by extension, prom ote aggregate demand for goods and services. IS The emerging
Republican Party supported U.S. indu stry and a high protective ta riff. With gains in
Congress in 1858 and the pivotal Presid en ti al election fast approachin~ th e writing
was on the wall fo r the return of higher import duties.
By 1860, pending tariff legislation left the state of Florida with an incentive to

secede. Though tariffs were not as high as pre·1857 levels, the duties were
nonetheless cumbersome to sh ippe rs, wholesalers, retailers, a nd consumers alike.
With the election of Abraham Lincoln in November, Florida businessmen feared a
return to high protective tariffs. These tariffs had growing importan ce to Floridians,
as co mm ercial hubs of activity had developed along Florida's Gulf Coast. The cotton
of Alabama, Mississippi, and western Georgia was reli ant on Gulf Coast port cities to
fi nd national and international markets. Business leaders in North Florida
attempted to divert a share of cotton traffic their direction to cap italize on this
trade. Apalachicola grew la rger earlier, but was s urpassed by Pensacola's deep

Ta ussig, The TarijJHistary a/the United States, Port 1,71.
IB Thomas Pitkin, "Western Republi cans an d the Tariffin 1860," The Mississippi
Valley Historica l Review 27:3 (December 1940): 401.
17
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harbor and better access to banking capital. 19 As Florida's agricultural output
increased with additional white settlers and slave laborers in the decades following
its statehood, so did the importance of its coastal cities in delivering these goods to
pOints north and west.
Population of Florida (Free and EnslavedJ20

1840
1850
1860
1870
1880
1890

54,447
87,445
140,424
187,748
269,493
391,422

Florida and other southern states with port cities grew in population and
demand for imported goods. This represented a potentially enormous source of
revenue for the federal government. In the midst of the secession crisis, Congress
debated authorizing of the Morrill Tariff Act, which would effectively raise duties at
all ports loyal to the U.S. government It garnered the support of President-Elect
Lincoln, who vowed he would sign the legislation if sent to his desk. 21 This was no
surprise to the South, as the very convention in Chicago that nominated Abraham
Lincoln as the Republican presidential candidate had also endorsed a platform
calling for a program of protective tariffs and internal improvementsP In fact, the
Chicago Journal in 1858 had argued that protectionist policies would promote

commercial development in the United States thanks to the efforts of "Tariff men,

Willoughby, Fair to Midlin', 83.
U.S. Census Bureau, Census Material from 1840 to 1890, Historical Census
Browser.
21 Harold Holzer, Lincoln, President-Elect (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008), 328.
22 John E. Johns, Florida During the Civil War (Gainesville: University of Florida
Press, 1963), 8.
19

20
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like Abraham Lincoln." Just a month prior to Lincoln's election, he acknowledged his
well·known history of standing with the Whig party in favor of "ampJe protection to

American industry" in the form of a tariff.23
Thus, the South's opposition to Lincoln's ascension to the presidency was not
only an over·reacti on to his anti-slavery platform, but also in response to his new
party's position on protective tariffs. Lincoln had clearly stated his in tentio n before
and upon taking office to not "interfe re with the institution of slavery where it

exists." 24 Though he viewed slavery to be wrong,25 Lincoln's acknowledged threat
to so uthern interest came in his support of the tariff. Ominous ly, he stated in his
inaugural add ress that invasion or the use of force would be relied upon in order to
"collect the duties and imposts."26 Senator Benjamin Wade of Oh io declared
protectionism to be one of the three basic tenets of Republicanism, a long with
opposition to the extension of slave ry and the support of free homesteadsP The
South could not be sure what actions Republicans would take towa rds even tu al
emancipation. The Republican platform on tariffs, however, left little to the
imagination.
A rush of orders from the South ensued fo ll ow ing the bill's March 2, 1861
signing (this pre-dated the Union blockade by six weeks), and northern
manufacturers and shippers worked overtime to fill the demand before the new

Roy P. Basler, ed., The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln (New Brunswick, NJ:
Rutge rs University Press, 1953), IV:125.
24 Ibid., IV:263.
2S Ibid., VII :281.
" Ibid., VII:266.
27 Pitkin, "Western Republicans and the Tariff in 1860," 404.
2l
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rates took effect on the first of April. Z8 Southern importers so ught to stock up on
northern goods, believing commercial prices would increase as northern importers
faced higher duties. 29 Fear set in - the fear of financial downturn as sign ificant as

that the nation had experienced four years prior. The Boston Post estimated some
$60 millio n a year in merchandise was being sold and shipped from northern ports
to southern ports by 1860. 30 The financial incentive fo r compromise was massive

among American businesses. Trade and investment between the regions acted as a
powerful socia l adhesive that res isted so lu tions rooted in armed conflict. Southern
merchants had a financial interest in cutting the ties that imposed high import
duties, but the same business concerns cou ld realize no benefit from armed conflict
an d the inevitable embargo. While a peaceful secession would have benefited
southe rn merchants by lowering prices, wa r simply sh ut down co mm erce with the
North.
As the reality of secession sunk in, New York business went into sleep
mode. 31 The merchant class of New York, Boston, and Philadelphia lamented the
loss of southern trade as state after state decl a red its departure from the Union. The
Morrill Tariff took effect a month after being signed into law, and higher import
duties became the northern coastal cities' new reality. So for eighteen days, import
duties we re double in the North as compared to the South, as a "War of Tariffs"
influenced orders for goods on the North American continent. Then, on Ap ril 19,

J

28 Kenneth Stampp, And The War Came: The North and the Secession Crisis, 18601861 (Bato n Rouge: Louisiana State Un iversity Press, 1970), 232.
"Ibid., 231.
30Emory Q. Hawk, Economic History o/the South (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,
1934),392.
31 Sta mpp, And The War Came, 231.
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President Abraham Lincoln issued the order to blockade the rebellious southern

states, and legal trade between ports within the United States and ports within the
Confederate States ceased, though blockade runners managed to get their share of
goods in and out of southern ports and the coastline.3 2

International respect fo r the blockade was paramount to its success.
Representative Benjamin Stanton of Ohio, seeking a peaceful resolution to the loss
of revenue previously collected in the now rebellious states, proposed a repea l of

the laws that authorized southern ports as points of entry. This would essentially
inform foreign business that goods could only be received at loyalist ports to the
North. If the Gulfports were no longer officially accepting foreign shipments, the
federal government was relieved of the responsibility to collect reve nu e there. 33 For
this plan to resolve the revenue portion of the cri sis, foreign trading partners would
have to demonstrate a respect for United States's power that had not been earned as
yet. Such a weak response would have proved ruinou s to the Union, as French and
British firms cou ld seek trading opportunities with a new nation, one that offered
much lower import tariffs fo r foreign goods.
Florida, with its near eighteen hundred miles of coastline, offered established
and developing port cities for European trading partners to establish new centers of
commerce. In the absence of an effective blockade of southern ports, the foreign
powers announced that they would do just that. Lord Lyons, the British minister to
America, notified the U.S. government that, in accordance with the Treaty of Paris,
Great Britain would not recognize a blockade unless it was thorough and effectual.
32 See

Chapter Three for details on blockade running.
33 Stampp, And The War Came, 119.
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Otherwise, the British would feel compelled by competition with her neighbors to
disregard the blockade and carry on their commerce with southern ports. 3 "

As plans for enforcing revenue collection laws were discussed in Washington
D.C., the escalated import duties signed into law by the outgoing president began to
take effect. The Morrill Tariff Act of 1861 is a bewildering piece of legislation. It
was a protective tariff, largely in response to the Panic of 1857, designed by
northe rn protectionists to drive up th e price of imported goods to promote
consumption of domestic manufacturing. Though the Act only raised tariff rates

moderately35, it was ill -timed. At the very moment when moderate southern
politicians were looking for a reason to remain loyal, an increase in import duties
added fuel to the mouth of the fire-breathers. The tariff gave seceded states no
financial incentive to return. Rather, it provided a disincentive. It was motivated by
economic interests - not for preservation of the Union, but rather for protection of
northern business. Northern manufacturers and traders by and large preferred in
descending order: a perpetual and expanding union, a peaceful secession in which
the South would remain the North's largest trading partner, or war. The exception
was those businessmen who would benefit from prolonged conflict, the warprofiteers who stood to gain from milita ry contracts for munitions and supplies. But
for the most part, option one would be desirable for business, option two
acceptable, and option three a disaster.
The Morrill Tariff, approved by the House of Representatives while southern
representatives remained in the legislative body, provided cover for those

-

-

34The (Tampa) Florida Peninsular, March 23, 1861, 2:2.
35 Egnal, Clash of Extremes, 248.
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secessionists unwilling to publicly base their entire argument on preservation of the
institution of slave ry. The bill was passed in the Senate on strictly sectional lines as
all northern senators voted in favor, and all remaining southern senators opposed.
As a precursor to the war itself and the issue of slavery, the South demonstrated an
uncanny ability to bring about through their own actions that which they feared the
most. Blaming the conflict on tariff concerns, however, diminishes the powerful
impact of slave ry on the national discourse. It is quite possible that "secession did

not take place because the Morrill Tariffhad gone thro ugh Congress, but, at most,
the Morrill Tariff went through Congress because secession had taken place."36 The
only chance to defeat the act was in the body of Congress where southern states had
equal representation, the Senate. Having abandoned that chance, the act was
financially overwhe lming to southern coastal business and was conveniently cited
as justification for the cause.
The governor of Florida, Madison Starke Perry,laid out the state 's case for
secession in an address before the Florida House of Representatives on February 2,
1861. Citing the "long suffering (endured) under the forms of legislation, and under
the shield of the Union," Perry compared the state's exodus to the Jews escaping
bondage in Egypt. 37 He comp lained of the federal government's intent to collect
revenue from Florida ports by means of force, claiming a clear violation of the

Karl Marx, October 25,1861, in Marx/Engels Collected Works, Vol. 19 (Moscow:
Progress Publishers, 1964) as found in

36

http://www.marxists.ore/archive/marx/works/1861/ys-ciyjl-war/jndex.htm

(accessed December 8, 2009).
a[the Proceedings a[the Senate a[the General Assembly a[the State a[
Florida at the Tenth Session, Begun and Held at the Capitol, in the City a[Tallahassee,
Monday, November 26,1860 (Tallahassee: Florida Sentinel Office by Hart & 8arefoot,
1860),250.

37 Journal
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state's sovereignty.38 Perry made little mention of slavery. Other than referring to
the opposition as the "non-slaveholding states," his rhetoric was focused on the
protection of Florida's sovereignty and the financial oppression of the North.
To make secession less about slavery and more about financial oppression
would appeal to the European powers that could potentially sway the war in the
South's favor. Slavery was distasteful to Great Britain and France, having effectively

di sa ppea red decades prior and brought to an official end in those nations in 1833
and 1848, respectively. If the argument for secession cou ld be shifted from slavery
to the financial benefits aftrading more freely and directly with the South, a case
could be made for Europe to once again become involved in conflict on the American
continent. As southern appellants of fo reign assistance such as T. Butler King were
quick to point out, peaceful secession would give European powers a trading
partner on the Gulfat lower tariffs, which would in turn result in more trade.
T. Butler King of Georgia believed that such a secession was warranted in
response to the Morrill Tariff. Southern opponents of the tariff pOinted to the self~
feeding nature of protection and lobbying.39 In an 1861 letter to the British
Parliament appealing for assistance, for example, King argued that as northern
industry grew, its power to lobby for protectionist policy did as well. This fueled
further growth, which in turn fueled the ability to push for even more protective
tariffs. King's central pOint was that

Ibid.
39 T. Butler King to Hon. Lord John Russell, 1861, p. 7, found in Item #2778, Reel 91.
in Confederate Imprints, ed. Marjorie Crandall (New Haven: Research Publication,
Inc, 1974).
J8
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the truly astonishing development of manufacturing industry has
grown up in the Northern States si nce the peace of 1815 under the influence
of the protective system, which, by imposing high duties on foreign goods,
operated as a bounty on all domestic fabrics, and gave to Northern
manufacturers co ntrol of the Southern market at an average profit of twentyfive percent on the sa le of their manufactured goods. 40
King gave lip se rvice to the compromise tariffs of 1833 and 1846, which both served

to mollify sou thern resistance, though he failed to acknowledge the tradeoffs
involved in exposing U.S. manufacturing to cheaper foreign goodS. 41

Elected to represent Georgia in the U.S. Hou se of Representatives in 1838,
King later served under President Taylor as his agent in California and a duty
collector at the Port of San Francisco. His work experience was evident in the
lengthy appea l he filed with the British Parliament and the French Republic for
assista nce, citing a bevy of statistics on imports, exports, and revenue at northern
and southern ports. King charted the growth in nominal value of the cotton and
sugar crops in the decade preceding secession. He claimed a 53 percent increase in
the total value of agricultural products produced in the South from 1850 to 1859.
During the sa me timeframe, he cited a $300 million increase in northern goods
shipped South, along with a $111 million increase in European good s shipped South
via New York at a 20 percent profit or greater.

His point was to demon strate the

exploitation of the South by arguing "that the shipping interest of the northern
States has been built up on the agricultural products of the southern States."42 If the
southern ports were freed from excessive tariffs on imports, British and French
man ufacturers would be able to better com pete with American industry for
Ibid.
41 King to Russell, 3·8.
"lbid.,9-12.
40
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American consumers. Northern newspapers predicted the trade relationships that
would bring about economic fuin, assured that should the south succeed, "she will
immediately form commercial alliances with European countries who will readily
acquiesce in any arrangement which wil l help English manufacturing at the expense

of New England.""
King delivered his letter to the fo reign ministers of Great Britain and France,
hoping to entice foreign intervention on behalf of the Confederacy. His argument of
mutual economic benefit was insufficient to ove rpower British objectio n to the
Confederacy's steadfast devotion to slavery or France's cautious analysis of the costs
and benefits of intervention. Great Britain was able to large ly replace the American
cotton crop lost with the blockade of southern ports by turning to Egyptian cotton,
but King pointed to the opportunity cost of not capitalizing on millions of consumers
in America's South by aiding in the rebellion .'!.4
Likewise, attempts to appeal to European powers with moral outrage over
the ta riff question produced no significant resu lt. Representative John Reagan of
Texas decried in early 1861 that the Union was "not content with the vast mi ll ions of
"tribute" (paid) annually under the operation of our revenue law ... and by making
(the North) our manufacturers, our merchants, our shippers."45 The words "tribute"
and "bounties" were highly inflammatory in the nineteenth-century western world.
As Barbary pirates off t he coast of North Africa harassed American, British, and

4l

Boston Herald, November 12, 1860 .

.. King to Russell, 7, 8.
of Representative John Reagan of Texas, January 15, 1861, Congressional
Globe, in The Causes a/the Civil War, ed. Kenneth Stampp, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice Hall,lnc., 1974), 66.
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French shipping concerns in the Mediterranean for much of the previous century,
the practice of paying "tribute" or "bounties" to hostile forces as a form of protection
payment became commonplace. 46 The European powers bided their time,
eventually sending observers and limited financial aid, but never offering their full
weight of support.

The repudiation of the Union tariff through secession was not meant to
suggest that the new nation would impose no duty on foreign imports. Though the
Finance Committee at Florida's secession convention recommended the sale of

treasury notes as the "least objectionable of all the methods that have been
suggested" for raising revenue, port cities were too valuable to ignore as a source of
tax collection. 47 The southern Confederacy had enacted their own tariff to take

effect on all goods bought after March 1, 1861. The promise of "Free Trade with all
the world," appearing in releases from the Associated Press, was never seriously
endorsed. 48 The secessionist leadership knew the importance of their ports to raise
the necessary revenue to maintain even a decentralized confederation of states.
Without possession of western territories, the Confederacy could not rely on the
sale of public lands to supplement their operating budget to the extent that the
United States could. Regardless, this source of revenue did not amount to much in
comparison to customs duties, which had represented the lion's share of federal

46

Richard Zacks, The Pirate Coast: Thomas Jefferson, the First Marines, and the Secret

Mission of 1805 (New York: Hyperion, 2005), 100, 109.
Journal of the Proceeding of the Convention of the People of Florida, 8egun and Held
at the Capitolin the City of Tallahassee an Thursday, January 3, A.D. 1861
47

(Tallahassee: Office of the Floridian and Journal. Dyke & Carlisle, 1861), 92.
48

McGuire & Van Cott, "The Confederate Constitution, Tariffs, and the Laffer

Relationship," 427.
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revenue in the years preceding secession. From 1856 through 1860, the United
States collected $299,228,268 in total revenue. Of th is, $272,294,765 was in the
fo rm of cllstoms duties, the rest from the sale of public lands and miscellaneous

items. 49
Before hostilities began, the Confederate Secretary of the Treasury expected
to raise in excess of$25 million from import duties in 1861 alone. 5o The ability to
levy taxes was w ritten into the Confederate Constitution. The frame rs deliberately
made sure that revenue tariffs were allowed, a nd protective tariffs were not. As
suggested by historical economists Robert McGuire and Norma n Van Cott"

delegates to the Confederate Constitutional Convention sought to maximize revenue
collecti on without unduly restricting trade opportunities. This reflected an
understanding of taxation principles th at had not yet been clearly articulated as the
Laffer Curve (ci rca 1974), that increasing taxes beyond a certain point work to
decrease revenue:

Bureau of Statistics, U.S. Department of Treasury. Imports and Exports o/the
United States, 1835-1898; And Receipts and Expenditures o/the United States
Government, 1856-1898 (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1898), 13.
so McGuire & Van Co tt,"The Confederate Constitu tio n, Tariffs, and the Laffer
Relationship," 429.
49
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Rev e nue
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Tax Rates
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Fig. 1.1. The Laffer Curve, demonstrating the relationship between tax rates and
potential revenue.
If Points A and B generated the same amount of tax revenue, the Confederate
government constitutionally preferred tariff rates at Point A. As consumers of
imported goods and not producers of domestic alternatives to those goods, there
was no incentive for the Confederate government to tax beyond the maximum

revenue rate. As import tariff rates increase, government revenue increases, and
prices on imported goods increase. This occurs up to a certain point, when demand
is adversely affected by increasing prices to the extent that government revenue
actually starts to drop. The only benefit of increasing tariffs beyond the eqUilibrium
point is the protection of domestic industry. Tariffs above the equilibrium rate are
protective in nature as they do not maximize revenue but have the effect of raising
prices of foreign goods. Florida secessionists sought to operate near pOint A of the
Laffer curve, drastically reducing tariffs to lower retail prices and benefit the state
commercial shipping industry. As demonstrated by the Morrill Tariff, the northern
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Republican goa l was to operate closer to Point B of the Laffer Curve, which yielded

greater protection of domestic industry at the expense of government revenue. The
outbreak of hostilities required the Confederate government to pursue higher
revenues at the expense of free trade policy, pushing towards eq uilibrium but not

beyond it. McGuire and Van Cott argue that the Confederate Constitution expressly

forbade protective tariffs.
The Congress shall have powerTo lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, for
revenue necessary to pay the debts, provide for the common defense,
and carry on the Government of the Confederate States; but no
bounties shall be granted from the treas ury; nor shall any duties or
taxes on importations from foreign nations be laid to promote or
foster any branch of industry51
Whereas the U.S. Constitution contains no such explicit denunciation of protective
tariffs, the Confederate Constitution specifically proscribes such policy. As such, the
Confederate Constitution limited tariffs to the lower end of the Laffer Curve.
Secessionist leaders in Florida did the same, placing a provision in the new state
constitution prohibiting taxes greater "than may be required for the necessary
expenses of government."S2
McGuire and Van Cott '5 conclusion, that the constitutional language suggests
"the tariff issue may in fact have been even more important in the ... tensions that led
to the Civil War than many economists and historians currently believe,"s3 gave
added significance to the busy ports of Florida's Gulf Coast in determining the state's

C.S.A. Constitution, art. 1, sec. 8, cI. 1.
52 Florida Consitution of 1861, art. 8, sec. 2.
53 McGuire & Van Cott, "The Confederate Constitution, Tariffs, and the Laffer
Relationship," 437.
51
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allegiance. In fact, the very first substantive ordinance passed by the Tallahassee
Convention in January 1861 was a declaration of intent to not pay further import
tariffs to the United States government. Ordinance No.2 stated clearly "that no
duties shall be collected upon imports from the states forming the late Federal
Union."S4 Florida put its priorities up front, stating implicitly that the state's
secession was rooted in the tariff issue. The United States government had been

willing to sacrifice some government revenue at southern ports to achieve
protectionist goals for northern industry as maximum revenue collection would
have occurred at lower rates. Florida had no vested interest in such a sacrifice.
Florida's secession contributed to federal deficit spending in both ways
imaginable: a need for increased federal spending to protect and defend the
remaining garrisons on the state and blockade the eighteen hundred miles of
coastline, coupled with a loss of federal tax revenue at high-traffic ports like
Pensacola and Apalachicola. The loss of Florida ports proved a drain on a federal
government already stretched beyond its limited framework. As the secession
winter progressed and more states left the Union, federal collection of revenues
dropped off. Customs revenue collected nationwide by the federal government
dropped from $53,187,511 in 1860 to $39,582,125 in 1861. ss In an attempt, to
maintain a flow of tax revenue from Florida's ports despite the state's secession, the
southern abolitionist and soon-to-be Minister to Russia Cassius Clay suggested in
February 1861 to merely continue enforcing the law by stationing revenue

54 Journal o[the Proceedings o[the Convention o[the People o[Florida, 110.
ss Bureau of Statistics, Imports and Exports o[the United States, 1835·1898, 13.
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collectors off the coast of southern ports.56 However, Florida's secession ordinances
exp ressly forbade these payments to be made. If the federal government wanted to
collect their duties, they would have to do so by force.
The federal government could not allow secession of the state of Florida
because losing that amount of coastline would make the southern border impossible
to control. Though the Florida ports provid ed the nation with a nominal amoun t of
tax reven ue, the ports provided a point of entry for federa lly taxed foreign goods. At
the ports, tariff co ll ection was feasible and s mugglin g was possible, but difficult.
Having the Pacific Ocean and the Gulf of Mexico provide the southern border to the
United States made it easier to monitor and regulate commerce. Secession would
create a more difficu lt to recognize southern land border for apprOXimately two
thousand miles, allowing fo r easy flow of tax-free goods into the North. The loss of
Atlantic and Gul f coast southern ports moved the border inland, making it ha rder to
patrol and undermining northern ports and tariff collection. The loss of Florida's
eighteen hundred miles of coastlin e represented just over half of the coastline lost
to the United States wi th the secessio n of the so uth ern states. The London Times
reported Europea n merchants speaking openly about the possibilities to ex pand
sales into northern U.S. markets because of the potential inabi lity to enforce tariffs
on goods trickling across this political boundary. 57 This presented a clear threat to
northern industry and the collection of tariffs in northern ports. If European
shippers knew they could deliver a product to all southern, western, and eventually

Cassius Clay to John A. Andrew, February 18, 1861, John A. Andrew Papers,
Massachusetts Historical Society in And The War Came, Stampp" 40.
S7 Stam pp, And the War Ca me, 233.
56
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northeasterrn American consumers at greatly reduced tariff rates, there would be
little incentive to maintain their shipping levels to Boston and New York, thus
stripping the federal government of its main source of revenue. 58

The loss of control over commerce within the nation and with Europe on the
American continent posed an unacceptable financial risk to New England industry.

The regional sovereignty gained through secession allowed Gulf Coast ports to
cha rge protective tariffs on northern goods and to charge export taxes on cotton
shipped to northern manufacturers. Because textile operators in the North were
reliant on the southern climate and soil, the potential taxes could not be avoided by
regional se lf- suffi ciency. The North could not simply grow their own staple crops.
The Boston Herald predicted in November 1860 the ramifications of successful
secession:
Should the South succeed in carrying out her designs, she will
immediately form commercial alliances with European countries who
will readily acq uiesce in any arra ngement which will help English
ma nufacturing at the expense of New England. The first move the
South would make wo uld be to impose a heavy tax upon the
manufacturers of the North, a nd an export tax upon the cotton used
by Northern manufacturers. In this way s he wou ld seek to cripple th e
North. The carrying trade, which is now done by American vessels,
wou ld be transferred to Britis h ships, which would be a heavy blow
aimed at our commerce. It will also se riou sly affect our shoe trade
and the manufactu re of ready·made clothing, wh il e it would derange
the monetary affai rs of the country. 59
Clea rly, the northern newspapers feared retaliatory tariffs on raw materials. This
would give Florida ports the ability to place export tariffs on cotton s hipped from
Apalachicola bound for textile mills in New York. If the Co nfederacy were successful
Bray Hammond, Sovereignty and an Empty Purse; Banks and Politics in the Civil
War (Princeton: Princeton Univers ity Press, 1970), 48.
59 Boston Herald, November 12, 1860.

58
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in establishing a separate sovereign nation, control of intra· conti nental comme rce
would shift from one unified power to two divided interests. Northern industry
would be threatened if Confederate export tariffs on raw materials drove up the

price of American textiles in compa rison to imported goods more so than the
protective tariffs could compe nsate for. The Union cou ld not all ow this to happen.
Duty collection records for Florida ports prior to the Civil War are
unavailable. But, ten years after the cessation of hostilities, approximate ly three
hundred thousand dollars in duties were collected in the Florida Customs districts.60
This figure was staggering to the small, backwoods state of Florida in 1875,
representing 12 percent of the entire value of goods produced in the state in 1860
($2,447,969) before the devastation wrought by war." Bya quarter of a century
after the war, over a million dollars annually was collected from these ports. 62
The ports of Apalachicola, Pensacola, and Tampa dominated the state's Gulf
Coast shipping in volume throughout the decades preceding the Civil War.
Apa lach icola's two lighthouses served as a beacon for commercial ships to p ly their
wares in the cosmopolitan frontier city. In addition to the seasonal population of
the Gulf port, custome rs could be found inland alo ng the longest and largest r iver
system in the Southeast, conveniently open ing onto Apalachicola Bay. The
Chattahooche/Apalachicola/Chipola/Flint river system penetrated deep into the

I
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61 U.S. Census Bureau, Census Material from 1840 to 1890, Historical Census
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cotton rich regions of Georgia and Alabama. Despite the inviting conditions,
Apalachicola returned disappointing levels of revenue to federal coffers during its
golden age of shipping in the 18405 as exporting cotton took precedence over

importing goods ofvalue.63 This was surprising given the nature of the shipping
industry. For oceanic commerce to be profitable, ships must be able to deliver
product on both legs of a journey. An empty ship at sea for months returning home
dilutes whatever profit was made on the initial trek In 1842-43, Apalachicola
loaded up over $3 million dollars worth of cotton but only unloaded $44,771 in
imports from those ships.64 The ships could not travel empty. They required ballast
to sail properly and were loaded with cheap potatoes, salt, and hay when inbound
for Apalachicola. 6s
As the Gulf Coast grew in population after Florida achieved statehood in
1845, the quantity and value of imported goods increased at a sim ilar rate. The
population of Florida more than doubled from 1870 to 1890, and this can be seen in
the growing amount of dutiable goods imported to Florida during that time period.

63 Willoughby, Fair to Middlin', 43.
'"'Ibid.
os Ibid., 47.
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Fig. 1.2. "Table of Receipts and Expenses. Florida, 1874·1893," in Imports and
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Relatively speaking. these numbers were Signifi cant in comparison to other
southern states. In 1874, Florida's $233,852 in co ll ected duty compared nicely to
Texas' $313,700. Ayear later. Florida collected $299,921. su rpassing Texas in
duties collected by $87,642. No other former Confederate state, aside from
Louisiana, collected as much federal tax revenue through the importation of goods
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during this time period. Florida's nearest competitors in port duties in the South in
1875 were South Carolina with $114,262 and Georgi a at $61,119 66
As a source of revenue at this pOint in history, however, Florida was only
significa nt to the Union's treasury in comparison to other southern and smaller
states. Collections in Florida in 1874 ran about 10 percent of Loui siana's

($2,259,665), about 3 percent of California's ($7,713,108), and only .2 percent of
New York's ($111,652,125)."

973

IMPORT DUTIES,
T.ABLE 011' RECEIPT8 AND EXPE~.8E8 - BY STATE8-Contiuned.
:No. !IS_NEW .YORK.

(Oo.tM" dl.trlcb. A)b&D.:r. Bntralo Cref!lk, Capa Vlncont., Cbamplaln, Dunkirk, Geneaee, Now York.
Niagara, OlSwegatcllie, Ol'lwego, and 5ag Bubor.]
VAine ofimported merohan·

l'\oeal

".,

IInded
JllU

10-

--

dieG.

F7ee of dot,'.

a~o

Dutiable.

I

A..moo.ut of duty reut,.ed.
Al"el"

ad

va orom
rat.e of
duty.

RepJar.

Erp6o!MI for Pereeut.
ool1K.tinl! th
age o f
Additional reven ue from oIpeDae
anll dla·
eu.toUUi.
to I~ U!a
erlmltlatr 6Cen' .
ing.

1874 . •• .
1875 . •• •
11116 . ...
J877 •• ••
1878 ....
1879 . .. .
18&0 ....

1881 ....
1882 ....
1883 ....
ISM ••••
1~ .. ..
JtIS6 ....

1887 . . ..
1S68 ....

188' ....

1890 ....

)891 ....
1892.
1193 ....

118, 276, 157. 71 r-s'l, 068, 865. 52
267, 022, 2(3. 13
811.312. 5'2, 42 I 226, 916,488.64
118,268. 3~5 . 88 . 212,203,~.88
109.208, 091.93 2U. 289, 630. OD
10:1,200. 754.38 215. 9l).j, 066. Of
138,060, 468. 11 300, 009,676.27
ISO, 4~ , 'i21. 83 3'20,166,56] . M
140,40!\, 591 . 64 858, BRO, 623. 77
152, 73L 19
136,«8,936. 56
H2,76J , 318, 58 322, ~7,130. 72
124,500, 580.10 215. D12,lSl. 24
137, il l2, 608. a5 !!l2. 932, 769. 97
1~,~, 860. 00
313, ftJD, 376.f8
183,778. 186. 90 321 , 915 , 660. ~1
165,702, 488. 00 . 326,630, 670. 32
177, 310, 8n. 71 3+i, 87"- 061. 75
~O, $.S8, eo9. 18 81',716,201. 4,2
301, 710, 6&3. 09 243,358,669.16
272. 891, 416, 61 276. 808, 492. 5e
lOij, 8i9. ~. 19 '

us.

Per e£.

ag ... '111 , 652, 12:;. 73 f2jIO, 130. 87 f2, 752. 850. 48
40 '80 108,935, 862. 05 1s., :m . 86 2, 923, ~-;O. U
44. '89 101,875, 740.48 110, 62.t.. 6f. 2, 776, 000. 80
191, 403. 00 2, 811, 2I.i9. 5.(,
~,805. 258. 12
91, 1~, 632. 05 121.!U0. SO 2.574,6'10.62
42'53
96, 388. 437.10 165, 008. OD 2.317, 308.52
"'63
43 '71 131,180.32:1.37 211, 825. 69 2. 617,987.51
43 .« 1:J9, U6f.,08S.51 174,141. J8 2, 92'J, 963.92
U'48 152. 3$5, fi'M. 53 426, 420. 89 2, 786, U/.. 90
42 '25 U7,OU. 827. 7S 749.029. 51 2, 942, 129. 90
4.1 '12 lSl, 424, 1S8. 16 169, U2. 59 S, 068, O~. 27
45'41. 125.:HI2. 507. 59 257,289.90 ! S. 085, H.t. 71
4.5 '18 132.6·16. 473. 35 569.261. 64 ' 2, 923,718.51
4S ' 66 }46, 433. 123. 74 865, MiI. 48 8, 198,765.98
....1 14-4. 568. 535, 2' 884,668. 79 . a, 102, 067, 50
147. j!81, alrl . .u 5.10, 976. 2S 3, 124, fi99. 81
" ' 70 15-10.61 5, 832. 13 SIU, 4S? 71 j S, 069, 453. 9-c
47 ' 06 148,2 11 , ::.63. 6Q 387, StS. t;g S, GaS, 897. 20
4V·(2 120,276, 418. IK 283, 0'2, 118 ' 2. S06. 790. U
4V'UT 137, 239, 634.71 260. 272 . ~ 1 2.93L 747.00

'2"7'

I

'51'"

Fig. 1.3. "Table of Receipts and Expenses, New York, 1874-1893," in Imports ond
Exports. Part I, compoEvans, 973.

S. Doc. No. 259, 53" Cong., 20 ' Sess. (1898).
" Ibid.
66

2 "7

2 '68
2 '72

3'09
2 '"
2 '40
t'9a
2 '11
"83

2
2''''

2 '40
2'2\
2 '18
lHS

,

2 ' 12

.",

2 '08
2 '33

2-1.

33

Florida's import tax revenue was much greater than or competitive with all
but the largest commer ce states (California, Louisiana, Connecticut, Massachusetts,
and Maryland).68 Combining all southern port revenue together and returning it to
regular treasury collections, the effect of reunification can be seen immediately
following the conclusion of the war. Total customs duties collected more than
doubled the year after the war, climbing fro m $84,928,260 to $179,046,631 69 due to
resumption of civilized commerce and the return of Southern ports to federa l tax

rolls. Though Florida tax revenue would be im portant to the federa l govern me nt in
the postwar years, it was dwarfed by the massive po rt collectio ns at New York City
to the point of insignificance. Florida's importa nce to the Union was not in the
amount of revenue generated by its ports, but rather in the control of those po rts as
pai nts of entry to commerce on the continent Flor ida's posi tion in the globa l
network of commerce came as an exporter of goods, providing the wares that were
shipped to Europe on the western leg of voyages that brought man ufactured goods
into America n ports. Without the exportation of cotton from Florida ports,
transatlantic shipping wou ld not have been nearly as profitable or commonplace,
thus reducing the total amount of import duties collected at all U.S. ports.
Florida's decisio n to secede was motivated in part by a desire to expand
import operations without paying the accompanying higher tariffs. If secession
were successful, Florida's lower ta r iffs would encourage European exporte rs to
make use of the state's vast coastline, especially as the population grew. Florida's
68

69
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ports, however, were vital to protection of import duties to the United States.
Though they were all but insignificant in terms of the dollar value of import tariffs
collected, the state was prized by the Union and the emerging Confederacy for its

potential to receive goods at any number of port cities and utilize the growing
transportation network to finish delivery. With Florida's secession, the South
gained an abundance of port cities from which they could potentially import goods.

The North lost control of over half of the eventual Confederacy's coastline with
Florida's secession, which threatened their very ability to continue to effectively
regulate the entry of foreign goods onto the continent and tax for both revenue and
protectionist purposes. For this reason, the United States government could not
acquiesce and allow the secession of Florida.
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Fig. 2.1. Principal sites for cotton exportation in Florida, circa 1860. Map by author.
Chapter 2

Florida in the Court of King Cotton
Florida's ports were important not only for the protection of import duties, but also
as a potential exporter of the country's most significant commodity. In the
antebellum South, cotton was king in terms of volume and dollar value of exported
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goods, representing more wealth than all other American exports combined. 1
Cotton's importance was huge already, and on the upswing as the southern states
pondered secession. 2 Florida, as an actor and an object in the secession crisis, was
in a position to take advantage of the growing cotton industry because of Its
abundant coastline near the heart of cotton country.
Back in the early nineteenth century. the transatlantic triangular trade that

had brought slaves to the Americas, raw materials to Eu rope, and rum to Africa
dramatically shifted and expanded. Two factors contributed to this: the invention
of the cotton gin in 1793, which exponentially decreased the labor costs associated
with bringing cotton to market, and legislation intended to halt the slave trade in
1818.3 As a result, Africa was removed from the triangle and the volume of
commerce between North America and Europe expanded. A new triangle was
formed, linking southern agricultural ports with centers of commerce in New York
and the industrial cities of the Old World. Florida's ports, as exporters of cotton,
became a part of that triangle in the decades preceding the Civil War, indirectly
trading their cotton for salt, manufactured goods, and European immigrants paying
passage on return voyages to America.4 Being part of the triangle meant the ports
were essentia l to the conflicting interests in the secession crisis that was to follow.
The ability to ship cotton from Florida's ports influenced the state's decision
to secede, made the state a valuable addition to the emerging Confederacy, and left

1 Douglass C. North, The Economic Growth a/the United States: 1790-1860 (New
York: W.w. Norton & Co., 1966), 68.
2 Bureau of Statistics, Imports and Exports a/the United States, 1835-1898, 11.
3 Willoughby, Fair to Middlin; 1.
'lbid,47.
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th e United States in a vulnerable position for continued global commerce after

losing the state. Florida's growing reliance on cotton shipments tied its interests to
an industry run on slave labor. Secession to protect the institution of slavery made
sense for a state banking on the growth of cotton exportation. If Florida could enter
into free and open commerce directly with Europe, its potential for profit would
expand. For the Deep South, Florida's ports presented options for moving the cash
crop of cotton to foreign markets and importing European goods directly to the
South. But from the perspective of the United States, the preservation of potential
points of exit for cotton through Florida ports was vital to the protection of the
nation's continued economic growth, as this trade funded the wealth of goods
pouring into the nation. Because of its ports' potential, both as an importer of goods
and an exporter of cotton, Florida was a prize.
Florida's location connected the optimal land for growing cotton and the
open sea required to carry the crop to market Ideal conditions for growing cotton
were located one to two hundred miles inland, perfect for growing but not for
shipping,S Cotton could be grown in northeast Florida, but conditions to produce
maximum yield were ideal just to the northwest in Alabama and Mississippi where a
particular combination of rainfall patterns. soil conditions, and temperature
coalesced,6 The cotton-rich states needed Florida and other coastal states as
conduits to distant markets. Without access to these markets, cotton wealth was
non-existent. Cotton production at the levels seen after 1795 was, by definition, for

5 Gavin Wright, The Political Economy olthe Cotton South (New York:
& Co., 1978), 14.

6

Ibid.

w.w. Norton,
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cash crop purposes. The only reason to produce cotton in high volume was to get it
out and to market. Profit-minded inlan d planters sought the optimal ports from

which to sh ip their product based on proximity and accessibility via rail or river.
Florida provided these planters with a viable option for the shipment of cotton.
Because of the ease of access, geographic location alone wou ld suggest the
most ideal points of exit for cotton to be shipped from the continent to be New
Orleans, Mobile, Apa lachicola, Charleston, and Savanna h. New Orleans had the

advantage of a shipping infrastructure that pre-dated the explosion of cotton

production and the creation of the United States. Neighboring Mobile was in close
proximity to the heart of cotton production and linked to the production fields
through the Alabama and Tombigbee rivers? Apalachicola offe red a port connected
to the largest and longest river system in the southeastern United States, one that
ran directly through the richest cotton fields in America. 8 The ports of Charleston
and Savannah were very mu ch to the east of the Cotton Belt, but were on the
Atlantic side of Florida, creating easier ship ping routes to England and New York or
Boston that wou ld bypass the navigational dangers of the Florida coast and
Caribbean islands. 9 The port cities of Galveston and Pensacola added to the already
crowded field of choices, each with their own advantages and disadvantages,
demonstrating the competitive nature of the antebellum cotton sh ipping business.
Because of the proximity of Florida's northern ports to areas of concentrated cotton
7 Willoughby, Fair to Middlin ', 121; Wright, The Political Economy a/the Cotton South,
14.
8 Florida Bureau of Land and Water Management, The Apalachicola River and Bay
System: A Florida Resource (Tallahassee: F.B.I. W.M., 1977), 1.
' Willoughby, Fair to Middlin', 124; Wright, The Political Economy o[the Cotton South,

16,
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production, the state offered options to planters seeking to transport their product
to northern and European manufacturers.
Thus, the cotton industry had a variety of choices when it ca me to exporting

its product. In the event any southern ports were lost to the nation, business
interests would shift exportation to those ports where they could escape regulation
or enemy interference. If no shipping were allowed out of American ports, cotton
planters would seek the nearest non·American ports to send their product to
market A precedent had already been set to utilize Florida ports for the exportation

of American cotton in the years before Florida had been annexed by the United
States. As early as 1805, Fernandina exported 77,000 pounds of cotton. When
Presiden t Jefferson imposed the poorly constructed Embargo Act of 1807, an
isolationist policy to eliminate all foreign trade, American cotton planters and
British shipping interests utilized Fernandina as a port of exit to evade the harsh
restrictions. 10 The eventual secession of Florida, therefore, presented to seceding
cotton states an option for transporting the ir products to market, doubling the
Confederacy's accessib le coastline.
Florida's port city of Apalachicola was the young state's chief site of cotton
exportation in the antebellum years.ll Apalachicola's prominence as a center of
commerce was on the rise, as cotton exports flowed from the port city to England
and France and modest shipments of consumer goods were received in return from

Paul E. Hoffman, Florida's Frontiers (Bloomington: Indi ana University Press,
2002),255.
II Christopher E. Horrell, "Plying the Waters of Time: Maritime Archaeology and
Hi story on the Florida Gulf Coast" (PhD di ss., Florida State University, 2005), 54 .
10

.J
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Europe.1 2 Apalachicola's pro spects for a profitable future were strong enough that
in 1843, its leaders sought a loan secured by potenti a) future earnings from the U.S.

House of Representatives to expand port operations and make harbor
improvements.13 As the third largest exporter of cotton in the nation during the
18405, the port city on Florida's panhandle held great promise for future growth. 14

Apalachicola served as a nexus between South and North, and between
America and Europe, connecting the agricultural regions of the nation's southern
frontier to the port of New York, the textile mills of New England, and the European
financing and retail markets. IS Cotton exports peaked in Apalachicola during the

1840s, reaching a value of$3,068,500 during the 1842-1843 season.'6

Entrepreneurs saw the potential profit in exporting cotton from Florida and
invested heavily in establishing competition for Apalachicola. The Lake Wimico &

St Jose ph's Canal and Railroad Company's establishment of Port St Joe, only twenty
miles to the northwest, threatened Apalachicola's dominance as Florida's chief

cotton exporter. 17 St.Joe's deep harbor and railroad connection offered a more
efficient and consistent operation than steamboat transportation of cotton to the

GutfCoast. But a yellow fever outbreak in the early 1840s left St. Joe abandoned and

Willoughby, Fair to Middlin', 40,43.
H,R. Doc. No. 279, 17'" Congress, 3d Sess., (February 23, 1843) .
.. Willoughby, Fair to Middlin ', 1l.
IS Ibid., 6-7.
16 Ibid., 43.
1Z

\3

17

Horrell, "Plying the Waters of Tirne", 54.
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Apalachicola the primary cotton port in the state ofFlorida. 18 This allowed
Apalachicola to prosper and concentrate on the expanding cotton trade.l 9
The exportation of cotton was the driving force in the United States'
economic growth during the first half of the nineteenth century. The rapid growth
of manufacturing that defined mid-nineteenth century America was funded in large
part by proceeds from the sale of cotton to British and French markets. As Albert

Bolles wrote in 1879, cotton was "as characteristic a product of [the United States]
as spices are of the Indies, or tea of China, but vastly more precious."2o From 1815
to 1860, cotton accounted for over half of the value of U.S. exports.21 U.S. exports

grew steadily during this period, especially in the period between 1844 and 1860

when annual exports increased from $105,745,832 to $333,576,057. 22 That year,
cotton exports valued at $191,806,555 accounted for 57 percent of all exports.23
The cotton trade set the trend for U.S. exports as a whole.

Ibid .
,9 Willoughby, Fair to Middlin', 42.
20 Albert BoHes, The Industrial History of the United States from the Earliest
Settlements to the Present Time: Being a Complete Survey ofAmerican Industries
(Norwich, Connecticut: The Henry Bill Publishing Company, 1879), 46.
2! North, The Economic Growth of the United States, 68.
22 Bureau of Statistics, Imports and Exports of the United States, 1835-1898, 11.
2l Stuart Bruchey, ed., Cotton and the Growth of the American Economy, 1790-1860
(Atlanta: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1967), Table K.
18
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Cotton expo rts were valued by the North not only for the profits to be made
financing, insuring. and shippi ng southern cotton, but also because they created a
demand for cargo vessels heading east to England and France. Profitable shipments
to the Old World meant reduced shipping costs and therefore greater imports back
to the United States. These imports. however, were directed at northern ports
where actual demand existed. The lower aggregate demand for fo reign imports in
southern ports as compared to northern cities was a resu lt of smaller populations,
lower per capita income, and less developed transportation infrastructure.
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Therefore, a triangular trade existed in which southern cotton purchased European
goods bound for northern markets. Ships returning from cotton runs to England
filled their cargo holds with manufactured goods that could not be made as cheaply
and efficiently in the United States and with European immigrants seeking
opportunities in the United States. 24 Thus, cotton shipments from southern ports
were inextricably linked to the importation of European goods to the United States.
As a result of the cotton trade, wealth poured into the young nation,
enriching planters, shippers, insurers, financiers, speculators, merchants, cotton

factors. and dock workers alike. As just one example, virtually everyone in and
around Apalachicola throughout the 18405 and 18505 made their living directly
from cotton. 25 Commerce distributed this wealth, as those associated with the
cotton industry saw their purchasing power increase and were able to fund the
development of other industries through their purchase of goods and services.
Nationally, the value of U.S. imports highly correlated with the value of cotton
exports, as cotton profits were turned around to purchase imported European
goods and to fund the development of industry in the northeastern United States. A
comparison of Figures 2.2 and 2.3 shows the similar trends in import and cotton
export values from 1815 to 1860. The wealth created by cotton was exchanged in
Europe for valuable goods, raising the average standard of living in the United
States.

H. Owens, "Apalachicola before 1861" (PhD diss., Florida State University,1966),
224-225.
2S Willoughby, Foir to Middlin', 30.
24
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Therefore, on a national scale, northern commerce was dependent on the
southern cotton trade. The north ern shipping and shipbuilding industries grew
because of the ability to ship a product grown exclusively in the South. Likewise. in

a symbiotic relationship, the growing cotton ind ustry was dependent on northern
shippi ng and cap ital inves tments. Cotton was the primary cash crop of the southe rn
states. The volume of cotton increased from 870,415 bales in 1830 to 4.5 mi lli on

bales in 1859, while the No rth's shipping tonnage matched like a balance sheet
during the same period : 872,578 tons increa sing to 4.48 million.26 T. Butler King's

1861 letter to Parliament requesting British recognition and assista nce framed the
Confederate argumen t of the persistent exploitatio n of cotton producing states for
26

King to Russell, 12.
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northern gain. According to King, the cotton flowing out of southern ports created
the wealth of the North, while it should have been the cotton states that were
profiting:
When we consider that... the Northern States were almost destitute of
agricultural products for exportation ...we can readily perceive the
causes which have produced the great accumulation of wealth in the
Northern section of the Union. It has been shown that through the
instrumentality of that system the Northern states have secured to
themselves great profits on all branches of their industry, and the
entire monopoly of Southern commerce, both foreign and domestic. 27
The mayor of Apalachicola expressed similar concerns over the necessity of
northern involvement in the cotton trade when he petitioned the Florida House of
Rep resentatives in 1860 for public investment in harbor improvements.28 Citing
Apalachicola's $3.2 million in cotton exports over the preceding twenty months and
its meager thirty·three thousand dollars in foreign impo rts over that sa me time
period, Mayor Samuel Benezet questioned the logic of routing cotton exports
through New York and depending on northern ports as the centers of commerce:
Why not save all those Northern expenses and build up Southern
cities instead of Northern? We have shipped over three millions and a
quarter to Europe, a large portion of it will be worked up and shipped
to the North and the people or Florida will go there and buy it. Why
not ship it back to Apalachicola and buy it there instead of at New
York? This can be done and we have the capital at Apalachicola to do
it... 29
Throughout the 1850s, more than half of the cotton exports from Apalachicola were
rou ted through the northern ports of New York, Boston, and Providence and less
"I bid., 13.
28 Journal

of the Proceedings of the House a/Representatives a/the General Assembly

of the State of Florida otits Tenth Session, Begun and Held at the Capitol, in the City of
Tal/ohossee, on Monday, November 26,1860 (Tallahassee: Office orthe Floridian and
Journal, Dyke & Carlisle, 1860), 14-17.
" Ibid., 16.
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than half were sent directly to European markets. 30 But the status quo benefited
northern financing and shipping interests in a symbiotic relationship with southern
cotton producers, giving the North an interest in preserving its role in the cotton
trade.

This inte rd epende nt economic arrangement increased the amount of cotton
that could be so ld on the open market. Of those planters who grew cotton in north
Florida, the overwhelming majo rity relied on commission factor merchants

ope rating out of the state's ports and often routing the product through New York. 31
The long periods of time between harvesting the crop and delivery to manufacturers

necessitated an investment of capital to keep the planters well suppJied.J2 In the
cash· poor Sou th, that investment had to come from northern capitalists. Without
northern investment, the South would have been unable to expa nd cotton
production to the high levels seen before the war. Because of the South's reliance on
northern shipping and cotton merchant factors, who marketed the product to
manufacturers foreign and domestic, northe rn cap italists were able to siphon away
a share of the wealth being grown on plantations in the South)3
Though the trade was dependent on a combination of slave la bor, southern
land, and northern financing and shipp ing34, outspoken secessionists of the cotton
south, like Mayor Benezet, believed the northern investors and shipping conce rns

Willoughby, Fair to Middlin', 40-4l.
Julia Floyd Smith, Slavery and Plantation Growth in Antebellum Florida
(Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1973), 158.
n Ibid., 159.
33 Ibid., 158.
34 Harold D. Woodman, King Cotton and His Retainers: Financing and Marketing the
Cotton Crop of the South, 1800-1925 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press,
1990),169.
30
31

J
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were disproportionately benefiting at the expense of the South. Likewise, Senator
Robert Toombs of Georgia attributed this discrepancy to the monopoly granted to
U.S. shippi ng co ncerns that "received higher freights than th ey could get in open
competition with the carriers of the world."ls Toombs believed that southern
dependence on northern shipping distributed too much of the cotton wealth out of
the states in which it was produced.3 6 This sense of injury contributed to southern
calls for secession, as the leaders of the cotton states believed failure to separate
from the union would bring about financial ruin.37

Both the North and the South sought to derive maximum benefit possible
from the international cotton trade. Because cotton exports paid for 60 percent of
domestic im ports in 1860 38, they were the indirect source of the majority of
government tariff revenue. The $333 million in exports that year were offset by
5353 million in imports. 39 From these imports, the federal government raised
553,187,511 in revenue in 1860. This accounted for 95 percent of all revenue
collected. 40 The expanding federal government used this revenue and then some,
spending $63 million from mid-1859 to mid -1860 on the War Department, the Navy
Department, Indians, Pensions, Interest on Public Debt, and other civil and
miscellaneous items.41 As federal spending skyrocketed during the Civil War,
postwar tariff revenue became all the more important in order to pay down national

3S "Th e Rebellion Record, Supplement: in The Causes o[the Civil War ed. Stampp, 63.
" Ibid.
31 Stampp, And the War Came, 136.
38 Bruchey, ed., Cotton and the Growth of the American Economy, 2.
39 Bureau of Statistics, Imports and Exports o[the United States, 1835-1898, 11.
40 Ibid., 13.
41 Ibid., 14.
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debt and maintain the expanded role of the government. Without cotton profits to
fund the imports, the United States government's primary source of income would
disappear.
The loss of cotton exports presented a potential fiscal nightmare for the
United States government, reducing tax revenue at a time of increasing government
expenditures to quell the rebellion. The loss of one tax resulted in the imposition of
others. President Lincoln and Congress authorized the nation's first income tax and
a tax on land and other property in August 1861 to offset the imbalance of revenue
and spending created by the war. The prevailing policy out of Washington D.C.,
however, was to treat the war 35 an extraordinary experience and to operate at an
unprecedented deficit in the short run. No serious attempt to generate sufficient tax
revenue to fight the war was considered. 42 A manageable deficit of seven million
dollars in 1860 climbed to $963 million in the last year of the war.4l Cotton, which
served as a global currency and directly purchased foreign goods, was vital to the
nation's long-term goals of paying down this massive debt and balancing future
budgets. Without cotton, imports would suffer. Without imports, the federal deficit
would climb.
Florida's significance to the cotton industry and thus to this larger concern of
fiscal policy was not as a producer, as the state's 1859-1860 production of 65,153
bales was miniscule in comparison to the heavyweights of cotton production. That

Bray Hammond, Sovereignty and an Empty Purse: Banks & Politics in the Civil War
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 264.
4l Bureau of Statistics, "Imports and Exports of the United States, 1835-1898," 3.

42
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same period, Mississippi turned out 1,202,507 bales and Alabama 989,955 ....
Though Florida's cotton production was on the rise, as the figures from 1860

indicated a 4S percent increase over the previous decade, this was comparable to
the increases Georgia experienced in the sa me time peri od. 4S Increases by cotton

powerhouses like Alabama (77 percent), Louisiana (337 percent). and Arkansas
(464 percent) put Florida's gains in context. 46 While cotton production was on the

rise throughout the South, the substantial growth occurred in the Cotton Belt to
Florida's north.47 The real contribution Florida could make to the growing industry

was to connect the South to textile manufacturers through ports of commerce. As
the map below illustrates, Florida's real contribution to the cotton trade was in its
proximity to the Cotton Belt and its extensive coastline.

Gilbert File & Jim Reese, eds., An Economic History of the United States (Boston:
Houghton Mimin Co., 1959), 158.
4S New York Times, July 6,1883.
46 Ibid.
" Wright, The Political Economy o[the Cotton South, 14.
4.
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Resenting the amount of profit north ern business interests were gleaning
from the cotton crop, so uthern planters met in Tallahassee in 1851 to discuss a
cooperative that would build warehouses in southern centers of commerce and take
over the marketing of cotton to foreign and domestic buyers.48 The "Florida Plan,"
as it was called, was to set a minimum price for cotton that planters would be
guaranteed by the association if they could not sell for that price on the open
market. But the South lacked the necessary capital to support such a plan. 49 Though

48 Woodman, King Cotton and His Retainers, 147.
"Ibid,
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it was abandoned, the Florida Plan strengthened southern resolve and fostered a

sense of unity.SO This dissension formed the basis of economic arguments a decade

later that augmented southern cries for secession and foreign assistance.
Florida's future as a cotton exporter was dependent on investment in the
state's rail infrastructure. Throughout the mid·18S0s, the development of southern
railroads and growth of co mpeting ports like Mobile and Savannah reduced
Apalachicola's cotton exports. The total value of cotton exported from Apalachicola
dropped from $139 million in 1853 to $67 million in 1858.51 As the railroad
ind ustry in th e South grew, cotton was less reliant on the south's river systems for
transport. Whereas port cities such as New Orleans, Mobile, and Apalachicola had
once been assured by their connecting river systems a place in the cotton trade, the
iron horse changed the parameters of the game. Railroads created the opportunity
for cotton to be routed to new ports, creating a sense of uncertainty in the cotton
trade.
In an attempt to lure cotton to th eir particular markets, Florida cotton
planters, along with local business interests, built rail lines to Pensacola as had
previously been attempted at Port St Joe.5 2 The Macon & Columbus and Central of
Georgia Railroads diverted cotton traffic away from Apalachicola to Savannah, while
construction of the Alabama & Florida Railroad threatened to redirect so me of
Mobile's cotton receipts to Pensacola. 53 Port cities with dedicated rail lin es won out

so Robert A. Taylor, Rebel Storehouse (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press,
1995),6.
51 Willoughby, Fair to Middlin ; 130.
52 Hoffman, Florida's Frontiers, 30 1.
53 Woodman, King Cotton and His Retainers, 88.

.J
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over those with river connections, as seasonal changes and water levels interfered
with year long shipments to ports fed by rivers. Various Florida ports became the
victims and beneficiaries of railroad development as the laying of tracks both
circumvented and connected previously relied upon river connections.
In 1855, a boom of railroad construction in the Sunshine State gave the Deep
South more options for exporting its cotton and receiving imports. The Tallahassee
& St. Marks Road was reconstructed and re-equipped through a combination of

public and private investment. 54 The Florida, Atlantic, & Gulf Centra l Company laid

track from Lake City to Jacksonville as the Florida Railroad drew up contracts for a
line connecting the gulf coast to Fernandina on the Atlantic,55 The Cedar Key to
Fernandina railroad cut across the state so that ships did not have to navigate
around the southern tip of Florida and the Keys, the most dangerous portion of the
trip, when traveling between New Orleans and northeastern harbors. Prospects for
the state's ports were exceedingly optimistic in the 1850s. As historian Rowland
Rerick wrote a half century later:
It was expected that Fernandina would become the great Atlantic city
of the South for the export of cotton; Tampa Bay the important
Gulf depot on the line from New York to San Francisco by way of the
Honduras Railroad, and Pensacola the most favorable city for the
import of goods for retail merchants of the middle South. 56
Florida was poised to take its position of prominence as a center of commerce.

54 Rowland H. Rerick & Francis P. Fleming. eds., Memoirs of Florida, Vol. 1 (Atlanta:
The Southern Historical Association, 1902), 226.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid.
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As Florida's shipping and transportation industry grew, the South was

strengthened by the dominant role cotton played in geopolitics. In 1855, David
King's influential work Cotton is King: or Slavery in the Light of Political Economy

extolled the importance of cotton to not only the national economy, but the global
economy as well. Perhaps more important than the arguments presented in the
book, the title phrase "Cotton is King" and its derivative "King Cotton" both had
staying power to influence the policies of southern states and the pride and unity of
the southern culture. The phrases were "soon on every Southern tongue

and ...became gospel by repetition ,"S7 The cotton trade emboldened Southerners to
take drastic steps towards protecting the institution of slavery that they might
othe rwise have lacked the capital and confidence to take.
As the "impending crisis" loomed, a rapidly expanding cotton crop amplified
the bargaining power of the Deep South. From 1855 to 1860, cotton exports
increased in va lue by 118 percent, going from $88,143,844 to $191,806,555.58 The
1859 season turned out an incredible crop, topping 4,500,000 bales of cotton, easily
more than double the crop of 1850.59 The cotton industry's exponential growth
gave the cotton states a greater incentive to control the marketing and shipping of
their own product.
Florida, though not an enormous cotton producer, was in a position to take
advantage of expanding production. By 1860, the sheer vo lume of the cotton trade
David L. Cohn, The Life and Times of King Cotton (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press
Publishers, 1956), 121.
58 Bruchey, ed., Cotton and the Growth a/the American Economy, Table K.
59 Lewis Cecil Gray, History of Agriculture in the Southern United States to 1860, Vol. 2
(Glouceste r, MA: Carnegie Institute of Washington, 1958), 1026.
57
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had pushed Apalachicola's cotton receipts above 130,000 bales, back to its levels of
1850.1851.60 Apalachicola's percentage of the cotton market had decreased, but the

development of rail lines throughout the Deep South allowed for previously
underutilized lands to be devoted to cotton production so that all significa nt

southern ports saw an increase of cotton exports in the two years preceding the
Civil War, including ApaJachicola,61 Florida port cities stood to profit from this

enormous growth.
The actual distribution of cotton shipments in 1860 indicated that Florida
ports, howeve r, were not nearly as prominent as competing sh ipping centers.
Despite attempts by merchants and entrepreneurs in north Florida to establish the
infrastructure to facilitate massive cotton exportation, Florida ports continued to lag
behind their neighbo rs to the west and east. Florida's cotto n shipping totals in 1860
amounted to just 9 percent of the amount of cotto n shipped out of New Orleans
during that same year.

Number of Cotton Bales Handled, less transshipments between the ports
Vear Ending 31 August 1860"
Apalachicola, St. Marks, and other Florida ports
Galveston, Texas
Charleston, South Carolina
Savannah, Georgia
Mobile, Alabama
New Orleans, Louisiana

,

192,724
252,424
509,308
531,219
843,012
2,139,425

Willoughby, Fair to Middlin', 14.
6] Ulrich Bonnell Phillips, A History a/Transportation in the Eastern Cotton Belt to
1860 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1908), 20.
62 Lewis Cecil Gray, History 0/ Agriculture in the Southern United States to 1860, 696.
60
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Throughout the antebellum period, the cotton trade shifted dramatically

from port to port, seeking the path of "'east resistance,"63 From the period covering
1855 through 1860, New Orleans experienced a 94 percent increase in its total
exports. During the same period, Savannah's imports increased by 128 percent and

Mobile 171 percent.64 Cotton was the dominant export for each of these ports. The
export figures were increasing at all cotton ports due to increased CUltivation, but
some faster than others, as bales were routed over rail lines as fast as southern
engineers could lay track. In the years before t he war, shipping options were
plentiful and growing.

The dynamic nature of cotton exportation seen in the shifting hubs of
commerce meant that control of Florida's ports were as important to the nation's
prosperity as New Orleans, Mobile, Savannah, Charleston, and Galveston. The
federal government could not allow the existence of foreign ports in such proximity
to the Cotton Belt for fear of losing control of the cotton trade. If Florida were
allowed to peaceably secede, cotton shipments would pour out of the state and be
exchanged for federally untaxed import goods.
The United States government needed contro l of the southern ports but
lacked the ability to enforce that control at the moment of secession. Three months
after Florida seceded from the Un ion, the federal government declared a blockade
on all southern ports. The inability of the United States to effectively enforce this
blockade during the first year of the war gave the Confederacy options as to how to
proceed regarding their cotton trade. Shipments from the cotton ports to New York
Willoughby, Fair to Middlin', 7.
64 Bruchey, ed., Cotton and the Growth a/the American Economy, Tab le M.

63

57
bound for Europe ceased abruptly, as was appropriate for belligerent parties. Direct
shipments to England and France before the blockade could be enforced, however,
presented opportunities for either much needed revenue or diplomatic coercion,
but not both.
The Confederacy cou ld have utilized the time it took the United States to
build an adequate naval force in order to sell as much cotton as possible to fund the

growing co nfli ct. Instead, the So uth opted for what became known as King Cotton
Diplomacy. During the early years of the war, the South pressured England to
recognize the sovereignty of the Confederacy and perhaps to even intervene in the

war on their behalf. The theory held that a self-imposed embargo on the cotton
trade with England would have such disastrous effects on the British economy that
the superpower would have no choice but to recognize southern independence and
pay top dollar to continue clothing their people.65 Though preventing cotton from
leaving through the weak blockade engendered more European support for the
southern cause, the South missed out on a opportunity to generate much needed
revenue to prosecute the war.66
Florida had its share of proponents in favor of a coe rcive cotton policy.
James B. Owens, a delegate to the secession convention in Florida, argued "the
cotton states alone, without the firing of a single gun, could by one years masterly
enactivity (sic), lock the wheels of every important interest throughout the civilized
world.'" Owens went on to suggest that cutting off the cotton supply would bend the

Hamilton Cochran, Blockade Runners of the Confederacy (Indianapolis: The BobbsMerrill Company, 1958), 28.
66 Woodman, King Cotton and His Retainers, 207, 208.
6S
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world's commercial and manufacturing powers to the will of the South. 67 Governor
John Milton was an ardent supporter of King Cotton diplomacy, taking "legal, extralegal, or actually illegal" actions to halt the unapproved traffic of cotton through the
federal blockade afte r taking office in October, 1861. Milton maintained this policy
until Confederate Attorney-Generalludah P. Benjamin disallowed further

interference with a n already fede rally restricted trade.68 The Confederate

leadership had decided that the revenue of cotton sales took precedence over the
attempt to coerce European involvement.
Realizing the amount of revenue being sacrificed by ceasing al l cotton
exports, the Confederate congress lifted the embargo on cotton trade so that
blockade· runne rs cou ld use Florida ports to smuggle cotton out of the Deep South.
More effective blockades were in place around the Savannah/Charleston and
Pensacola/Apalachicola regions, so the Confederates made use of a small inter·
coastal waterway at Mosquito Inlet to head down the east coast to Titusville, where
cotton could be loaded onto blockade runn ers heading to Caribbean markets. 69
With the lack of improved transportation in Florida during the war, running cotton
out of the peninsula was difficult, but not impossible. The extensive rail system in
Georgia was put to use, alo ng with wagons and river steamers and the Florida

James B. Owens, "The Right, Causes and Necessity for Secession: Argument of the
Hon. James B. Owens, delegate to the State Convention of Florida on the secession
resolutions of Florida," State Convention of Florida on the Secession Resolutions of
Florida, 1861, p. 29 in Confederate Imprints, 1861-1865, ed. Crandall.
68 Frank L. Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy: Foreign Relations afthe Confederate
States of America (Chicago: The University orChicago Press, 1931), 19, 36-37.
" Taylor, Rebel Storehouse, 32-33.
67

59
Railroad line, to get at least some cotton to port during the warJo As the war
progressed, the Confederate government employed agents in negotiating sales for
cotton to foreign buyers through blockaded ocean ports.71 Cotton faded as a

bargaining chip and instead became once again a commodity for acquiring other
goods.

In an effort to resupply and acquire more wealth, planters employed
blockade-runners to deliver the cotton to market, not always meeting with success.
Rear Admiral Bailey reported to the U.S. Secretary of the Navy in October 1863 of
the destruction of Confederate profiteer James McKay's steamer the Scottish Chief
and the sloop Kate Bale in the Hillsborough River as the vessels were loading with
cotton and about to set sail. The Admiral took some pride in believing he had sent a
clear message to the Rebels concerning the future of Rebel cotton shipments.72
McKay also reported a similar incident that year, noting that about a hundred enemy
troops Hwent up to where a steamer lay loaded with cotton named after our friend
A.B. Noyse and set her afire and destroyed her 'ere we were aware."73 No fewer
than eighty-six ships carrying cotton were captured or destroyed by the blockading
squadron throughout the conflictJ4 But as late as January 1864. the U.S. minister to
France informed Secretary of State Seward that cotton was being run through the

Ibid.
Woodman, King Cotton and His Retainers, 217.
72 Frank Moore. ed., The Rebellion Record: A Diary ofAmerican Events with
Documents, Narratives, J1Justrative Incidents, Poetry. Etc., Vol. 7 (New York: D. Van
Norstrand Publishing, 1864), 566.
73 James McKay to Pleasant White, October, 18, 1863, White Letterbook, July 15,
1863 - April 12, 1864, Pleasant White Papers, Florida Historical SOCiety, Cocoa, FL.
74 Taylor, Rebel Storehouse, 38-39.
70
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blockade surrounding Florida with little interference.1 s Blockade-runners like
McKay used these shipments to bring back highly demanded foodstuffs that
commanded a high price along Florida's coast.

As the war concluded, cotton growers made use of the internal
improvements to resume more regular shipment of cotton from Florida ports. The
New York Times reported that as early as July 1865, trains were arriving in

Jacksonville loaded with cotto n, sugar, syrup, and other products of the country, to
be shipped to market.76 Florida's ports, unencumbered by a federal blockade,
expanded shipping operations after the war. By the turn of the century, New
Orleans experienced a significant decrease in cotton receipts due in part to the
redirection of a considerable amount of traffic to Pensacola.1 7 According to a report
issued by the Treasury Department in 1900, "improvements in transportation
methods have resulted in great variations in th e receipts of cotton at various ports."
The greatest change in cotton exporting s ince the war was the growing receipts at
cities relying on rail connections over those cities directly connected to the Cotton
Belt by rivcr.78 Pensacola's importance to the cotton trade was not visible at the
moment of secession, but its potential was realized in the post-Reconstruction e ra.1 9
The ability to export cotton influenced Florida's decision for secession and
made the state more important to the Union and the Confederacy. Severing the ties

Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy, 275.
76 New York Times, August 3, 1865.
77 Bureau of Statistics, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Cotton Trade a/the United
Stotes and the World's Cotton Supply & Trade (Washington, D.C.:Government
Printing Office, 1900), 2591.
" Ibid.
" Ibid.
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of northern shipping and financing best protected the economic interests of
Florida's port cities in the eyes of delegates to the state's secession convention. The

1,800 miles of coastline that seceded from the United States along with the rest of
the state presented the Confederacy with growing options for centers of commerce.
Florida's ports played a minor, though not insignificant role in cotton trade during

the secession crisis. The potential for growth in the cotton industry and the
shipping industry made Florida a valued asset to the rest of the Confederacy. The
very existence of Florida port cities separate and apart from the Union, connected to
the Cotton Belt by train and river, posed a risk to federal tax revenues and the flow
of income from England and France into the United States. Because of the potential
to ship cotton directly from these ports and receive European goods in return,
Florida held a position of economic importance to all parties concerned
disproportionate to its small population.
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Fig, 3.1. Regions important to Florida's cattle trade circa 1860, including cattle-rich
counties and port cities for potential export and import Map by author.
Chapter 3
Shipping Florida Beef
As secession turned to war, Florida's potential as a cotton exporter was
overshadowed by its ability to supply beef cattle to soldiers in the field. Whil e

control of the cotton trade was a long-term priority to both the United States and

63
the Confederate States as independent nations, control of the cattle trade was of

more vital concern to the immediate war effort. If an army truly marches on its
stomach, then Florida was a valuable asset to either side as a supplier of beef.

Moving Florida animals, however, was not an easy task. Cyrus Parkhurst
Condit's 1855 novel, A Trip to Florida for Health and Sport, depicted the arduous
task of loading Florida scrub cattle aboard schooners for shipment to the West

Indies, Charleston, and Savannah. Cattlemen drove their steers into a holding pen
before roping and hOisting them over the bow of the ship and down into the cargo

hold. The cows resisted mightily, unwilling to trade terra firma for an unfamiliar
experience without a Fight. In the end, however, the cattle resigned to the will of
their captors and stood on the sh ip "with their heads over the sides and plenty of
fresh air," bound for distant ports, both foreign and domestic. t It is an account
rooted in reality, as Florida's geographical distance from population centers and its
abundance of coastline lent itself to increasing cattle shipments in place of cattle
drives throughout the antebellum era. As the nation plotted a course towards Civil
War, the coupling of Florida's ports with its per capita cattle holdings made the state
a valuable commodity to Union and Confederate forces alike.
The emerging Confederacy needed Florida's ports to ship cattle in the event
the federal government responded with military force to the secession of southern
states. The ability to supply troops by sea through Florida's ports as opposed to
transporting cattle over land held the promise of expedited movement of resources.

Maurice O'Sullivan & Wenxian Zhang, eds., A Trip to Florida/or Health and Sport:
The Lost 1855 Novel of Cyrus Parkhurst Condit (Cocoa: Florida Historical Society
Press, 2009), 55-58.
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The Port of Tampa could potentially serve as a funne l, pulling in the mid-state cattle
and redirecting them to the ports of Apalachicola, Pensacola. Mobile, and New

Orleans where they could then be directed upriver or along rail lines to Confederate
troops. The uncertainty of war made it impossible for southern interests to fully

predict the value of Florida ports as the state's leaders opted to join the
Confederacy, for federal response could only be predicted, not known. But the
state's large cattle holdings, relatively small population and internal demand for
beef, and immense coastline made Florida all the more attractive to the Confederate
cause.

At the time of secession, cattle had been in Florida for three and a half
centuries. In 1521, Juan Ponce de Leon introduced the first small herd to Florida.
He was unable to tend to them for long, having been run off and mortally wounded
by the natives near Charlotte Harbor. Over the next fifty years, cattle trickled into
the peninsula in small numbers, brought by Spanish conquistadors like Hernando de
Sota, Don Diego Maldonado, and Tristan de Luna. Runaway cattle that escaped
inland from these explorers as they trekked along the coast were the ancesto rs of
the state's successful cattle industry, much like the oranges discarded by Spanish
sailors gave rise to Florida's citrus industry.2
In the early seventeenth century, as settlements and missions became more
established, the Spanish made organized attempts at cattle ranching in Florida.
Existing herds were still small, but adapted to the Florid a landscape through
generations of selection. Ranchers imported prime breeding stock of cattle,
2 George H. Dacy, Four Centuries o/Florida Ranching (St Louis: Britt Printing Co.,
1940),19.

6S
primarily via Cuha, and these bulls mated with cows whose ancestors had arrived a
century prior. Open range cattle grazing. as was the Spanish custom and the norm
in colonial America, wreaked havoc on European relations with Native Americans,
as herds tore through crop fields and devastated food supplies. Territorial
governor Don Jo seph de Zunega issued land grants to encourage settlement of the
peninsu la in the latter half of the seventeenth century. Spanish colonists cleared
and burned huge tracts of land, which were utilized as pasture. 3 In the late 17005,
the pasture land extended to the Pensacola area, known as "the Old Spanish

The growth of Florida cattle occurred with setbacks and surges, subject to
the conflicts of competing interest groups vying for control. At alte rn ating times,
European powers, Native Americans, and the United States vied for control of the
peninsula, including the cattle, through armed conflict. A series of brutal and
expensive wars waged against the Seminoles by the Americans in the first half of the
nineteenth century left the peninsula with its cattle largely intact, while its native
population had been driven out or killed. The territory had changed hands many
times over. Power shifted from Seminole to Spanish to British to Spanish to
American. Florida's scrub cattle roamed the land and grew in number, oblivious to
the nationality of their herders.
As Florida became a territory in 1821 and a state in 1845, American business
interests moved in and sought to capitalize on the peninsula's natural resources.
E. Rouse, The Criol/o: Spanish Cattle in America (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press. 1977).76.
4 Terry G. Jordan, North American Cattle -Ranching Frontiers: Origins, Diffusion, and
Differentiation (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. 1993). 107.
3 John
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U.S. Commissioner of Agriculture Isaac Newton wrote of Florida that "the whole
interior ... can support a population of one hundred to the square mile with one half
the labor required to live in the eastern and middle states,"S With approximately
one perso n per s quare mile statewide in 1845, the entrepreneurs in Florida had
barely begun to exploit the region's environment for profit. Captain William B.
Hooker was the dominant cattle baron of Florida in terms of herd size throughout
the 1850s. At the beginning of the decade, he owned more than 2,500 head. He
nearly quadrupled this count by decade's end. Settling in the Hillsborough County
region after leaving his birthplace in Georgia, Hooker realized the busi ness potential
of trans porting cattle by ship. In 1854, he began shipping out of Hooker's Point at
Tam pa Bay to Key West and the West Indies, supplying Florida scrub cattle to the
small number of federal troops stationed at Florida's southern tip and th ei r families
and Caribbean island markets, which paid in Spanish gold. 6 The captain acquired
more grazing land to the south and east of his Hillsborough operations, expanding
his herds in the process. Getting out of the cattle game as the national pol itical
climate worsened in 1860, Hooker so ld his holdings to what would become the most
significant partnership of Florida cattlemen during the Civil War, that of Jacob
Summerlin and Tampa's James McKay?

Newton, Report of the Commissioner 0/ Agriculture for the Year 1862
(Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1863).
6 Joe Akerman, Florida Cowman, A History o/Florida Cattle Raising (Kissimmee:
Florida Cattleman's Association, 1976), 44-45.
7 Canter Brown, Jr., "Tampa's James McKay and the Frustration of Confederate
Cattle-Supply Operations in South Florida," Florida Historical Quarterly 70:4 (April
1992): 412.
S Isaac
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Summerlin parlayed his meager inheritance of a few calves into a vast herd

by careful management and acquisition of free-roaming Spanish scrub cattle.
Spreading word ahead to cowmen that they would be sweeping the area, McKay and
Summerlin bought up cattle at low costs to be sold primarily in the Caribbean
market at a comfortable profit. McKay, who had been shipping cattle to the
Bahamas since 1854 8, partnered with Summerlin to begin a lucrative cattle trade

with Cuba in 1858. A series of nineteenth century revolutions on the island had
depleted its cattle holdings, and Florida's close proximity and abundant herds
provided an ample supply.
McKay and Summerlin sought to connect Cuba's high demand for cattle with
Florida's abundant supply. In August 1860, The Florida Peninsular weekly
announced that McKay had recently purchased a steamer, which he christened The
Salvor that was "particularly adapted for the transportation of cattle."9 That year,

the two men exported 4,016 head of cattle to the island south of Florida via
steamship.IO These shipments embarked out of primarily Tampa, but afte r a severe
drought killed a large segment of the herd, prime grazing land and exportation
shifted to Fort Myers and Punta Rassa about seventy-five miles to the south to
afford better grazing land near the port of debarkation. McKay constructed an
eight-hundred-foot loading dock and wharf near present-day Punta Go rda for the
purpose of shipping cattle to Cuba. The cattle trade to Cuba took on increasing

• Joe A. Akerman & J. Mark Akerman,Jacob Summerlin: King o[the Crackers (Cocoa:
Florida Historical Society, 2004), 44.
, The (Ocala) Florida Peninsular, August 4, 1860, 2:2.
10 Brown, "Tampa's James McKay and the Frustration of Confederate Cattle-Supply
Operations in South Florida," 414 .
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significance for McKay and the Hillsborough economy when McKay's sawmill went
up in flames in early 1860, taking with it five thousand to six thousand dollars worth
of materials and numerous jobs. 11

The fire at the mill came in a year of political and economic upheaval for
Florida, and the nation as a whole. As secession became more of a possibility, beef
purchasers in Cuba became concerned about the supply of Florida beef being cut off.
By pushing so many cattle into Cuba during 1860, Mckay may have been attempting
to cash out while he stil l cou ld; uncertainty in the beef supply chai n drove up prices
for cattle in Cuba and gave Florida cowmen and incentive to sell fast. Ranchers in
Manatee County, south of Tampa, attempted to capitalize on the market as well, as
they drove steers to the Manatee River for transport to Key West and the
Bahamas. 12 Meanwhile, cowmen to the north in Payne's Prairie drove herds forty
miles to Baldwin to be loaded on the nearly completed Florid a Railroad line so that
they could be shipped out of Fernandina to the ports of Savannah and Charieston,13
By the middle of the ce ntury, therefore. Florida had deep reserves of cattle
and access ibl e ports to ship beef and other commod ities to strategic locations. This
was particularly important as the nation neared war, and armies on both sides
would need feeding. Cattle dealers themselves had on ly recently realized the
eno rm ous potential of connecting northern urban demand for fresh beefwith
Florida's ample supply. In August 1859, the schooner G. Hoffman shipped 135 head
11 Canter Brown, Tampa in Civil War and Reconstruction (Tampa Bay: The Unive rsity
of Tampa Press, 2000),17.
12 John Solomon Otto, "Florida's Cattle Ranching Frontier: Manatee and Brevard
Counties (1860)," Florida Historical Quarterly 64:1(July 1985): 55.
13 Lars Andersen, Paynes Prairie: A History o/the Great Savannah (Sarasota, FL:
Pineapple Press, Inc, 2001), 104.
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of cattle from St. Augustine to New York. Northern shipping attempted to expand to

hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of cattle with the use of steamships on a
three-day journey depositing "upwards 0(200 cows to the shores of the Chesapeake
or the banks of the Delaware River." 14 Hopes for this trading network dissolved
along with the Union, but the ability to tran spo rt live cattle out of the state to other

markets was well demonstrated.
Cattle were more numerous in several other states, but contingency planning
placed a high value on Florida's scrub cattle herds because of their durability,
proximity to water transport, and a local supply that far outstripped demand. The
cfiolla cattle of Florida were tough and adaptable to changes in their
surroundings. 1S Rich mineral deposits in the grazing land helped to prevent salt
sickness and skeletal deficiencies. 16 While less durable herds dissipated in the
South, the descendants of Spanish cattle in Florida flourished as they were crossed
with other European breeds to become even better suited to Florida's ranges and
c1imate. 17 And Florida's cattle were tough, "immune to endemic stock diseases and
able to subsist on coarse native forage, scrubs required no veterinary care and no
supplementary fodder." 18 Therefore, Florida's scrub cattle had a ruggedness that
was beneficial in attempts at transport

14 Robert A. Taylor, Rebel Storehouse, 11.
15 Akerman, Florida Cowman, 15.
16 Dacy, Four Centuries a/Florida Ranching. 27.
17 Akerman, Florida Cowman. 13.
18 Otto. "Florida's Cattle Ranching Frontier," 55.
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Though spread throughout the state, the largest herds were concentra ted in
Hillsborough and Manatee counties, in close proximity to the port ofTampa .19 This

facilitated an easier transfer of cattle to distant ports as very li ttle land needed to be
traversed before shipping. These herds grazed in the ideal ranch ing lands
surrou nding Tampa Bay. Hillsborough County boasted per capita cattle holdings

that rivaled the holdings of the most cattle rich ranches in the Deep South. zO The
1860 Census put Hillsborough's total cattle holdin gs at 37,820." Its ne igh boring

county to the south, Manatee, claimed 31,930 head of cattJe,22 The state
comptroller estimated two years later that the total number of cattle in the state had
ri sen to 658,609 head.23 In a state where cattle could never be very far from the
coast, the add ed bonus of lu sh grazing land and large herds in close proximity to
Tampa Bay enhanced Florida as an asset to the emerging Confederacy.
Florida had more ca ttl e than its 140,000 people needed. When it came to
butchering the animals, the distribution of sou th ern popul ation influenced what was
served at su ppertime. In an era reliant on natural preservatives, pork proved an
easier meat to smoke or salt; it made more sense for geographi ca lly isolated families
to feed on smaller li vestock. Pork was, therefore, much more a main stay ofthe

I' Sheila Lee Tagliarini, "Tampa, a Southern Cowtown, 1858-1878" (M.A. Thesis,
Unive rsity of South Florida, 1996), 26.
zo Robert A. Taylo r, "Rebel Beef: Florida Cattle and the Confede racy, 1861-1865"
(M.A. Th esis, University of South Florida, 1985), 8.
'I U.S. Census Office, Agriculture o[the United States in 1860, 18.
" Ibid.
23 Akerman, Florida Cowman, 83. Either earlier counts were overly conservative, or
th e comptroller's figures were inflated. An increase of this magnitude is
qu estionable, as cattle was driven out of state by land and shipped to Cuba and Gulf
ports for Confederate consumption. Regardl ess of th e actual number, the state's
rich stock had dearly multiplied.
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southern antebellum diet than beef, but war planners recognized the value of cattle
to feed fighting forces. 24 One cow could feed many, and therefore made more sense
to feed to armies than families, who needed to be concerned about wasting a large
animal that could not be well preserved after slaughter. A lack of internal demand
in a sparsely populated state had checked the growth of Florida's cattle industry.
Even so, in 1860 there were nearly three head of cattle for every person, free or
ens laved, in the state of Florida. 25 The sparsely populated state of Florida simply
did not need the quantity of cattle held in 1860 because its human inhabitants were
so few and far between. In fact, the vast majority of Florida contained fewer than six
people per square mile. 26

Taylor, "Rebel Beef," 1-4.
2S U.S. Census Bureau, Agriculture o/the United States in 1860, 18; U.S. Census
Bureau, Census Material from 1840 to 1890, Historical Census Browser.
24

26

Dixon Ryan Fox, Harper's Atlas of American History (New York: Harper and Brothers,

1920),56.
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Fig. 3.2. Distribution of Population in 1860 showing population density of Florida and
neighboring areas. Dixon Ryan Fox, Harper 's Atlas 0/ American History (New York:
Harper and Brothers, 1920), 56 .

As the possibility of secession by the slave-holding states became a reality,
the logistical support Florida could offer that cause became even more apparent At
388,060 head, Florida's cattle stock in 1860 was not as large as most of the rest of
the Confederacy. Only South Carolina boasted fewer beef cattleP On a per capita
basis, however, Florida was rich in livestock, ranking second among all its

27
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U.S. Census Bureau, Agriculture a/the United States in 1860, 18-38 .
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Confederate allies to only Texas, whose herds had less access than Florida's to the
Gulf of Mexico for easier transport than over land.28 Florida's lush grazing land also
gave it even greater potential than the vast arid sections of Texas as a source of
nutrition for the region. 29 As a result, Florida had a surplus of cattle to sell.

1860 Population
United States

South Carolina
Georgia
Florida
Texas

Brevard County. Florida

31,443,321
703,708
967,286
140,424
604,215
246

1860 Cattle/Human Ratio
.8 to 1
.7 to 1
1.0 to 1
2.8 to 1
5.8 to 1:"

31 to 1'1

Florida's cattle surplus was a significant source of wealth and income for the
state. 32 Nearly 70 percent of the value of Tampa's exports in 1859 were from
shipping cattIe. 33 With the election of President Lincoln in November 1860, McKay
accelerated his shipments to Cuba, purchasing nearly ten thousand head from
William Hooker, and spending virtually all of the next seven months making runs to
and from Cuba out of Punta Gorda. 34 In the midst of the secession crisis, McKay was
able to strike a deal with the Union garrison at Fort Jefferson and the Dry Tortugas,
George E. Buker, Blockaders, Refugees & Contra bands: The Civil War on Florida's
Gu/fCoast, 1861-1865 (Tusca loosa: University of Alabama Press, 1993), 144.
29 Taylor, Rebel Storehouse, 9, 12.
30 U.S. Census Bureau, Agriculture of the United States in 1860, 18; U.S, Census
Bureau, Census Material from 1840 to 1890, Historical Census Browser.
31 Otto, "Florida's Cattle Ranching Frontier,N 59.
32 The Florida Peninsular, July 28,1860.
33 Tagli arini, "Tampa, A Southern Cowtown," 30 .
34 Brown, "Tampa's James McKay and the Frustration of Confederate Cattle~Supply
Operations in South Florida," 414~16,
28
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supplying their beef and receiving a guarantee that federal forces would not
interfere with his cattle shipping concerns to Cuba.35 The relationships McKay
fostered during the secession cris is with high-ranking Union officers se rved him

well in the years to come.
Confederate demand for beef combined with Florida's growing cattle
industry to provide for a mutually beneficial business venture. The estimates of

Florida's comptroller regarding the size of Florida cattle herds encouraged Colonel
Lucius Northrop of the Confederate Commissary Bureau to tap in to the deep
reservoir of Florida beef. The fastest way to delive r beef to from the cattle rich
Hillsborough region to Confederate troops in action was not on the hoof or via an
underdeveloped railway system, but rather by a straight line across the Gulf of
Mexico and

re~entering

the continent at Apalachicola, Mobile, and New Orleans.

Unfortunately for the Confederate war effort, one week to the day after the
commencement of hostilities at Fort Sumter, President Lincoln issued an executive
order creating a naval blockade of the states in rebellion. Lincoln acknowledged in
his order the effects the blockade would have on local econom ies, stating that even
"with a view ... to the lives and property of quiet and orderly citizens pursuing their
lawful occupations," the act was necessary to ensu re enforcement of revenue law
and secure the safety of the hi gh seas. 36

l
l

This blockade at first could only exist on paper. Even after the Uni on

l

blockade of Florida's Gulf Coast officially went into effect, McKay had months before
the U.S. Navy was able to have in position ships to effectively implement such an

" Ibid.
,. Basler, ed., The Collected Works of Abraham Uncoln, IV:338.
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order. The U.S. Navy at the outset of the war consisted of a mere forty-two dutyready ships, with thirty vessels away on foreign assignment. Of the remaining
twelve, only four were in port (therefore reachable by mid-nin eteenth century
communication immediately) and could be dispatched immediately to blockade the
vast southern coastline. Despite its initial shortcomings, the blockade was serious
and vita); by the end of the first year of the war, 188 vessels had been added to the
federal fleet. 37 However, fewer than twenty ships maintained the East Gulf Blockade
of thirteen hundred miles ofshoreline. 38

Colonel Northrop sought to deliver meat to Confederate soldiers east of the
Appalachian Mountains, instructing his man in Europe to contract for blockaderunners to deliver beef and bacon to eastern armies. 39 McKay and Summerlin were
the logical choice for such an operation. Though McKay, an entrepreneur and
successful merchant, had declared his Unionist convictions prior to the war, he was
an adaptable businessman capable of shifting his customer base without ideological
quaims. 40 Fearing seizure of his property due to his continued dealings with Union
forces at Key West, McKay transferred ownership of his cattle herd to his friend and
partner, Summerlin, the largest cattle owner in the state of Florida. 41 The
Confederate Commissary, in turn, granted Summerlin a two-year contract to supply
2,400 steers per month to the army at a rate of eight to ten dollars per head.
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40 Brown, Tampa in the Civil War and Reconstruction (Tampa Bay; The University of
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While Florida cattle became increasingly important to the Confederate war
effort, the federal blockade made it nearly impossible to utilize the state's Gulfports
to deliver beef to the mouth of the Mississippi River. The United States'
government took decisive action to preven t the flow of cattle by sea from central
and western Florida to Confederate troops in the Deep South. Apalachicola and

st.

Marks were the only developed ports along Florida's Gulf Coast to be aggressively
blockaded by Union naval forces. 42 These ports, along with Mobile and New
Orleans, would have made ideal pOints of entry for cattle from central Florida via
Tampa Bay. The well-blockaded Apalachicola opened at the mouth of the largest
river system in the South and New Orleans at the mouth of the Mississippi. From
these ports, Florida cattle could have been siphoned out of Tampa, across the Gulf of
Mexico, up the ApalachicolaJChipolaJChattahoochee River system or the Mississippi
River.
Florida ports were particularly important for cattle transport because of the
lack of investment in interstate railroads that plagued the South. During the war,
Florida's rail system was still largely undeveloped, existing on a small scale to
connect ports within the state.43 Construction of an intra-state system linking Cedar
Key on the Gulf coast to Fernandina on the Atlantic was completed by the onset of
hostilities, but this merely presented the opportunity of moving cattle from one
blockaded port to another without ever leaving the state. Meanwhile, the only
competing rail line out of Tampa had stalled due to state subsidy disputes. 44 To
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make matters worse for the Confederates, Union forces seized Cedar Key early in

1862, cutting off any access to the railroad's terminus. Regardless, the sparsely
populated Florida had no rail connections to population centers outside the state.
Major C. McClenaghan of South Carolina visited Tampa in 1863 to investigate the
difficulties in transporting cattle out of state over land. He urged the completion of a
rail line connecting the Pensacola and Georgian Railroad at Live Oak and the
Savannah, AJbany and Gulf Railroad a t Lawton, Georgia. 45 Major Joseph Locke,
commissary agent for the C.S.A. in Georgia described the difficulties faced in getting
the cattle out of Florida.
The Cattle are scattered at this time afyear and are more difficult to
collect th a n in the spring. The rains have been unusually heavy
recently and the country so much und er water in the Cattle region
th at it is difficult to get them out.. .. These difficulties and delays are
quite intolerable. 46
Making the journey overland by traditio nal cattle drive proved a difficult task
for a whole host of reasons. For one, the terrain to be covered was largely unsettled,
undeveloped, and fraught with hazards. Bears, panthers, jaguars, mosquitoes, and
especially wolves preyed on cattle herds traversing their territory.47 No cattle could
be driven through the swamplands of sou th Florida. Even in centra l Florida, where
the majority of herds grazed, high waters delayed cattle drives for months on end.
In addition, good grazing regions were well s pread out; a lack of forage after the
winter frosts further delayed the driving of cattle through the north of the
45 David j. Coles, "Cattle Wars: The Civil War in South Florida, 1864-1865," Florida
Cattle Frontier Symposium, Florida Cattleman's Association, Kissimmee, FL, 1995,
66.
46 P.w. White to j. L. Locke, September 8,1863, Pleasant White Letterbook, Pleasant
Woodson White Papers, Florida Historical Society Library, Tampa, FL.
47 Akerman, Florida Cowmen, 87.
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peninsula. 48 Florida's weather patterns posed a danger to cattle remaining in state;
Summerlin lost several hundred head to drow ning and flying debris brought on by a

hurricane that struck the Tampa area in 1852. 49
Human interference posed an even graver concern, as state leaders feared
that the Seminoles living in poverty and hunger could be swayed by Union
representatives to take up arms against Confederate Commissary agents and attack

the cattle drives. so These cattle raids had already become a common practice for
Union forces stationed at federally held forts stretching all along the Gulf Coast of
Florida. The U.s. Second Florida Cavalry and the Second United States Colored
Troops, with regiments positioned at Fort Myers, Cedar Key, St. Vincent Island, and
St. Andrew Bay, were instrumental in disrupting and discouraging cattle drives out
of the Hillsborough and Manatee County regions.51 Major Edmund Weeks ordered
Captains Henry Crane and James D. Green with their companies to Cedar Key for the
express purpose of harassing cattle drives and recruiting Floridians into Union
ranks. 52 The loyalties of Floridians exhibited the fluidity of a border state as
deserters and refugees actively and passively assisted the federal government.
Unruly bands of disenchanted former Confederate so ldiers made it a regular
practice to steal or kill cattle from the herds held by the Confederate Commissary.
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Many of these cattle were then sold directly to the Union Army at various coastal
cities,53

In addition to the frustrations imposed by hostile man and beast,

experienced cowmen capable of delivering the herd to strategic locations to the
north we re in short supply. As the Confederate Commissary Department sought to
drive cattle northward, they discovered that the most able-bodied men had

volunteered in the first call to arms and were unavailable to ass ist. Later
conscription had robbed the sparsely populated state of its adult male population

and not properly accounted for the needs of those left behind or the management of
the state's valuable resources. Though cattlemen were able to receive an exemption
from active military duty, enlistment numbers rose at the same time new cattle
brands declined in Hillsborough County.54 The cattle were present; the ability and
manpower to manage and drive the herds was absent.
In early 1862. Union naval forces seized the town of Apalachicola to cut off
receipts of cattle shipments from the Tampa area. The East Coast Blockading
Squadron put a clamp on northern Gulfports of entry, but wisely created a porous
blockade near Tampa Bay. Cattle could get out of the western gulf coast of Florida,
but not into the panhandle or northern gulf coast ports of the Confederacy. William
Dayton, U.S. minister to France, reported that according to his sources, huge
segments of the west coast of Florida were left entirely unguarded. AB. Noyes, a tax
collector at St. Marks, repo rted that Tampa was without any blockading vessels at

53 Akerman, Florida Cowman, 90.
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all, and that the port of Cedar Key to the north was left entirely unmolested.55
Imposing a strict embargo on all ports was likely to turn some local sentiment
against the Union. Instead, the federal government was able to generate sympathy

by allowing the outflow of cattle and the return of foodstuffs to small communities
along the southern Gulf coast. It was only when shipments threatened to
strengthen Confederate strongholds that enforcement was stepped up.
The outflow of cattle to Cuba greatly enriched the ranchers and shippers
invo lved in the trade. Caribbean trade of cattle was preferred by ranchers because
the Union and Confederate forces in Florida insisted on paying for cattle with their
respective nations' currency. Cuban buyers, on the other hand, were willing to pay
in gold doub loons. McKay and Summerlin, doubting the true value of the notes they
were paid in due to the uncertainty of the war's outcome, shifted the focus of their
enterprise almost exclusively to Cuba, going so far as to hid e cattle from the
Confederate Commissary so as to se ll at a later date in exchange for gold.56 Demand
for beef was high in Cuba, and the blockade made the supply even scarcer, elevating
the price of an

eight~dollar

Florida steer to two ounces of Spanish gold; benefiting

the shippers who were ab le to run the blockade. McKay continued shipping his
cattle to Cuba despite the blockade, though at reduced numbers. During this time,
Summerlin's herds were able to grow at an annual rate of five to eight thousand
calves. 57 The blockade suited the cattlemen just fine, as they received top dollar for
those cattle that got to market while the remaining herds were able to multiply. As
S5
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a result of Florida's ports and close proximity to Cuba, blockade-runners were able
to inject much needed wealth into the war-torn sta te's economy.
During the war, the people of Florida needed the blockade-runners to deliver

supplies. Through 1861, McKay had shipped over six thousand cattle to Cuba, using
the proceeds to purchase nour, bacon, sugar, salt, and tobacco for the return voyage
to Florida shores, which were sold for a combination of bank notes, Confederate and
Union scrip, and Spanish coins. Profitable shippin g required the transportation of
goods on both legs of the journey, and McKay did just that. Evading Union

blockaders outward bound with cattle was the easy part; the Union forces had an
incentive to allow cattle into the Gulf of Mexico as long as the ships were prevented
from docking and unloading at northern gulf ports. The blockade was more
concerned with McKay's return trips from Cuba and other Caribbean islands.
McKay's expert piloting allowed him to hug the southern peninsula as he made his
way to the Caloosahatchee River, evading Union revenue cutters that were unwilling
to navigate the treacherous shallow waters so close to the shore.

58

The map below

illustrates the barrier islands and intercoastal wate rways that confronted
blockaders and runners.
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Fig. 3.3. South Florida's treacherous coas t, including Keys, barri er islands, and
intercoas tal waterways. Augustus Mitchell, Mitchell's New General Atlas

(Philadelphia, PA: S. Au gus tu s Mitchell, 1860), 59.
The dangers of shipwreck or ca pture and subsequent hanging were

outwe ighed by th e potential payoff. Though cattle were chea p in Florida, they cou ld

be traded in Cuba for precious commodities: wheat flour that would fetch $125 a
barrel, sugar forty dollars, and salt twenty-five dollars a sack. 59 With such a high
profit motive, blockade running was carried out almost exclusively by private
contractors who catered to a combi nation of civilian demand and Confederate

" Ibid., 56.
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military needs. 60 As such, the Cuban cattle trade allowed merchants like McKay to
diversify their commodities to appeal to both markets. While much of this trade
was harmless to the Union war effort, the goods sent out of state could also be used
to purchase war materiel for Confederate troops.

McKay's return trips held the potential for more harm to the Union war effort
than his exportation of cattle. The exodus of cattle from the state reduced potential
Confederate beef supplies because of the more restrictive northern Gulf Coast
blockade. Union forces were more concerned about inbound shipments from the

Caribbean. Realizing where the real money was, McKay apparently switched to
dealing arms. His vessel, the Salvor, ran aground and was captured in late 1861
carryin g an impressive assortment of rifles, revolvers, large can nons, and
ammunition purchased in Cuba. 61 He was not alone. The steamer Florida effectively
ran the blockade in 1862, carrying a cargo of twenty· five hundred rifles and sixty
thousand pounds of gunpowder into Saint Andrews Bay.62 Florida's immense
coastline presented the Confederates with an opportunity to smuggle arms that
Union forces would have great difficulty restricting.
By 1863, the war had endured far lo nger than either side anticipated, and
beef supplies from other states were exhausted or fell under Union control. With
the Confede rate surrender at Vicksburg in the summer, trans-Mississippi beef
shipments to Confederate forces shut down and all future beef supplies would have
to come from the East. The greatest remaining concentration of cattle accessible to
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the Confederate forces by the end of 1863 was in Florida's inte rior.63 Florida beef
became logistically more important in feeding the Confederate soldie rs in the lowe r

south, rescuing the Army of the Tennessee from starvation in the later years o f the

war,M Commander Woodhul of the U.S. Navy recognized the ri sing importance of
Florida beef, s tating succinctly
The cattle of Georgia, Alabama, North Carolina, a nd South Carolina
have been consumed. Texas and the rich grazing country to the
westward of the Mississippi being cut off, the whole dependence of
the Confederate government to feed their army now rests on
[Florida]'S

McKay and Summerlin's dealings with the Confederacy neve r really paid out.
Most of the 25,000 cattle delivered to the C.S.A. were paid for in Confederate

currency or war bonds. By mid-1863, excessive co unterfeiting and dismal war
prospects had devctlued these notes. McKay took to hiding some of hi s herd east of

the Kissimmee River, away from the Confederate commissary officers, until such
time as the war had ended and he cou ld resume unmolested trade with Cuba

again.66 Two years later, with the defeat and surrender of the Confederate
government, all of Summerlin's accu mulated notes were worthless. Effectively,
Summerlin had contributed approximately 25,000 head of cattle to the Confederate
war effort. 67 All told, Summerlin's contract with the Confederate Commissary
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department should have netted him over $200,000, but he did not receive a dime.66
Through utilization of notes backed by a doomed nation. the C.S.A. was able to
exploit Summerlin's cattle holdings for the war effort to prolong its very survival.
As the tide of the war turned, Union forces exploited the cattle holdings of the
state. Florida's cattle had even less loyalty than the disenchanted Confederate
troops conscripted in the same state. They filled the stomachs of any marching
army, blue or gray. The ability to move cattle in Florida became a zero·sum game,
where losses for one belligerent party were gai ns for the other. Union regiments
stationed in Florida were encouraged to suppleme nt their regular rations with the
abundance of livestock and vegetation offered by the land, reducing the supplies of
the Confederacy and making the logistics of war all the more difficult.
Following key victories in early July 1863 at Gettysburg and Vicksburg, the
Union armi es were on the offensive and began to turn to Florida for beef and other
livestock, further weakening Confederate supplies.69 Union occupation of Florida
I

I

coastal cities allowed for periodic raids upon the pen insula's interior, the theft of
cattle al ready in Confederate possession, and quick retreat into fortified port cities.
Federal cattle raids not only hu rt the Confederacy, they helped maintain the Union's
presence in the stateJo Federal troops could be more easily sustained in Florida if
they were not reliant on the supply chain to reach them for basic necessities. By
pu rchasing cattle from local sources before it was bought up by Confederates w ith
devalued currency, Union troops were able to extend their occupation, deny cattle to
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Confederate troops, and foster relationships with Floridians that a id ed in the traffic
of supplies a nd intelligence.
By 1864, federal occupation of inland fortifications allowed for the removal
of cattle from Florida to feed northern forces, A New York Times piece pOinted to the
importan ce of Florida beef as supplies in Tennessee, Virginia, South Carolina, and
Georgia ran dry. The columnist boasted of the longstanding knowl e dge that Florida
could serve as a storehouse for cattle and swine to supply armies, noting that "(t)he
prairies afford excellent pasture; cattle require little care from t heir owners and no
housing in the Winter; and, in most parts of the state, hogs fatten without any other
support than that which they derive from th e roots and mast of the forest."71 Union
General D.P. Woodbury, Commander of Key West and the Tortugas, set a goal of
gathering cattle from the sizeable he rds of the Caloosahatchee rive r vall ey and
transporting them North via shi pping vessels. To acco mplish this goal, General
Woodbury reoccu pied Fort Myers on the southern Gulf coast, stagi ng raids on local
cattle ranchers and disrupting the flow of beef north. Woodbury liberally estimated
that as many as two thousand cattle per week were finding their way to Confederate
armies from the Fort Myers area before his interdiction,12 The reoccupation of Fort
Myers allowed the Union to reverse the flow of cattle to th e ir own usage. Florida
Rangers stationed in Fort Myers siphoned as many as 4,500 head of cattle out of the
state through a long wharf they constructed for that very purpose. 73
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The Union's soft blockade and willingness to trade with locals won more
popular support than the Confederates' demand fo r absolute co mm ercial loyalty.J4
While ma ny sma ll er ranchers lost their cattle to Confederate impressment, Union
forces made it a rule to not seize beef belonging to Union loyalis ts. Even up the
coast, where the blockade was stronger, Fl oridi ans were able to engage in

commerce with the enemy. General Braxton Bragg, C.S.A., imposed economic
sa nction s on citizens of Walton County. cutting them off from Pensacola after
lea rn ing that loca ls were supplying th e East Gulf Blockading Sq uadron with fresh

beef and vegetables. Later, when Confederate forces had a ban doned Pensacola. the
relationships built by Union forces with local cattlemen all owed for trade to resume.
A stea mer captu red by the Union Navy was used to shuttle cattle from Sa nta Rosa
and Walton Co un ties to nearby Union garrisons.7 5 Not su rpris ingly, the local
Floridians showed more loya lty to the forces that encou raged more co mm erce.
In the spirit of forg iveness endorsed by President Lin co ln, Summ erlin
successfully rece ived a pardon for his actions supplying Confederate a rmies with
beef. He cited in hi s petition that threat of having hi s herds impressed into
Co nfederate duty with or without co mpensa ti on and therefore chose to accept pay
to support his family.76 Summe rlin was then able to reinstate the profitable cattle
trade with Cuba years after th e war, supp lying th e Spanish Army wi th beef
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throughout the 18705. 77 In 1872, over fifteen thousand cattle were shipped to Cuba
from U.S. Gu lfports, primarily out of Florida.78 Captain Francis Hendry, who was
still cutting his teeth as a cattleman during the Civil War, gave an even less
conservative estimate of Florida cattle shipments after the war, citing eighteen
thousand head of cattle being shipped out of Punta Rassa that same year. 79

Florida's cattlemen, businessmen first and southerners second, were merely
concerned to find buyers for their li vestock - they did not care with whom they
traded, so long as they profited. If the cowmen could not reach Confederate armies
with their product, they were all too happy to find a welcoming foreign market in
Havana, or in the occupying armies of the North. Newspapers appealed to the
patriotism of Florida cowmen, asking them to stop selling beef to the enemy or to
neutral third parties, encouraging Florida cattlemen to sell only to Commissary
agents of the C.S.A.BO Gold. however, was more powerful than appeals to Confederate
loyalty. and certainly more powerful than Confederate scrip.
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Conclusion
The root oflarge-scale human conflict is the protection of economic interests.
While the South sought to maintain its institution of slave labor and escape the
imposition of even higher import tariffs, the North faced the loss of federal property,
armaments, forts, infrastructure and military investments, land, potential tax
revenue, and co ntrol of its trading pOints of entry. The economic motivations for the
South to secede clashed with the interests of the North in preserving the trade
relationships that existed. In choosing the path that led to conflict over peace,
decision-makers leaned towards what they believed would be most profitable on

the margins. 1
In his magnum opus of secession era politics, David M. Potter explained:
Men are motivated by interests rather than ideals, ... they contend for
power rather than principles, and ... moral arguments are usually
mere rationalizations or secondary "projections," used by contending
interest groups to convince themselves or the public that they have
right on their side. 2
The protection of economic interests as rights can be just or unjust depending on
their nature. Contemporary thinkers of the war era and modern historians correctly
view the right to "wring their bread from the sweat of other men's faces"3 as wrong.
yet some other financial motivations may not be as clear-cut. The basics of
commerce and business interaction rang true in Antebellum America; regional
economies linked together, creating a national interdependence and participating in
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global commerce. The southern economy benefitted from a growing and vibrant
northern eco nomy. and vice versa. Yet, some regional interests ran contrary to each
other and created a climate of mutual hostility. Leaders of the secession movement
viewed separation as the preferred method of protecting and furthering a way of
life. Secession, however, could not be allowed in a perpetual Union, and war carne.
The representatives to Florida's secession convention elected to join their
brethren in South Carolina and Mississippi in attempting to exit the Union not only

for th e protection of slavery, but also for the economic cons iderations unique to a
coasta l state. The federal government and th e emerging Confederacy saw, in
Florida, opportunities for their own economic prosperity. The peninsula was valued
for its strategic position sepa rating the Gulf of Mexico from the Atlantic seaboard,
but also as a source of cattle and a potential point of debarkation for cotton. With its
abundant ports and growing economy, the state of Florida epitomized the
secessionist argu ment against protectionist trade policy.
The financial viability of a southern Confederacy was contin gent upon the
successful sepa ration of Gulf states from th e Union. A Florida unencumbered by
com mercial regulation ema nating from Washington, D.C., would have one set of
concerns regarding its ports of entry; a Florida in the violent throes of prolonged
civi l war would have quite another. If the state we re to secede, the response of the
fede ral government would determine which set of concerns were the more pressing.
Historical knowledge makes it easy to look back at the secession winter as the
inevitab le precursor to war. But the participants in history knew not the eventual
consequences of their actions and saw in Florida's ports only the inte rests they
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could attempt to protect. The economic interests generated by Florida's Gulf ports
provided a strong incentive for the state to secede. for the emerging Confederacy to
support that secession, and for the United States government to resist it with force.
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